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In This Issue

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- ◆ German War Records

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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS



COMMANDANT


Maj Gen Harold K. Johnson

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

Brig Gen Harry J. Lemley, Jr.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

Col Edward Chalgren, Jr.



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(U. S. Army War College)*

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STAFF ARTIST

Charles A. Moore

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**Brigadier General Howard S. Wilcox,
United States Army.**

SENIOR Army commanders need a friendly press. Without it, their best efforts and the successes of their commands never reach the attention of the public. Without it, relatively minor problems may be projected far out of proportion.

With a friendly press, a commander can contribute to the over-all stature of the Army, his command, and, by indirection, his own stature in the community and in the service.

A senior commander cannot delegate responsibility for press relations any more than he can delegate responsibility for training. The most experienced information officer (IO) in the Army rarely will be able to influence the opinion of a veteran editor or a publisher—neither can a press relations or a public relations man in business or industry. On the other hand, the president of a large business or industry who knows the editor

or the publisher personally and who has won his respect can often influence his thinking. Senior Army commanders can do the same.

It is my intention here to present a guide which may be used by any senior officer to establish close, cooperative relations with the newspaper or newspapers in his area.

My recommendations will not be unique. They have been used successfully in business and industry for years; neither will they be time consuming. They will, however, be new to senior commanders who have no newspaper background. They may save hours or weeks of confusion, and may save a career.

This report offers some yardsticks in press relations as they apply to emergencies during which a commander may be forced to deal with numerous representatives of the press, particularly those from distant papers.

Appreciate the Problems

As an Army officer, you have been trained for years to study and appreciate your opponent. I am not proposing that the press be considered as an enemy. I am proposing, however, that it can be an ally if you understand its problems.

You must recognize the press as a dominant force in creating and molding public opinion. It is not necessary for you to agree with all editorial stands. To permit your personal opinions to influence your official views toward press relations would be ridiculous.

I do not agree with every position taken by the papers I represent. A few years ago I was asked to address a convention of professional men on the subject of public relations. At the conclusion of my talk I invited questions. A man in the back of the room stood and said to me: "You have been talking to us about public relations, but as far as I am concerned, you represent the greatest dictatorship in America."

Brigadier General Howard S. Wilcox is Assistant Division Commander, 38th Infantry Division, Indiana National Guard. He is Director of Personnel and Public Relations for The Indianapolis Star and News and Director of Public Relations for Central Newspapers, Incorporated, which includes eight daily newspapers in Indiana and Arizona. From 1959 to 1960 he was President of The National Newspaper Promotion and Public Relations Association. General Wilcox was graduated from the Associate Command and General Staff Officer Course, Specialized Phase, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, in May 1961. This article received the Commandant's Award for Military Writing, USA CGSC.

My reply was very much unrehearsed, but it drew the complete support of the large audience, prompted the gentleman to leave the room, and actually contributed to my own understanding of the press.

Sir, I can only assume that you personally have disagreed with certain policies or practices of the papers. This is your privilege. However, as to the newspaper being a dictator, you should remember that there are 1,800 daily papers in the United States, each with publishers and editors who express their opinions, and as long as we have 1,800 dictators in our country, we won't have one.

Editing and publishing a daily newspaper is one of the most complicated and pressure-type jobs in American business or industry. Remember, a new product must be produced every 24 hours. Every page of the new paper is different from the day before.


Should you become concerned with the impatience of a newspaper reporter or photographer, just try to remember that he is being paid to get today's news today. If he does not get it, someone else will. Should this happen many times, the newspaperman probably will have to find another way to make a living.

Should you be concerned with the phraseology of a story about you or your command, try to remember that several people, in addition to the reporter, may have worked on the story before it appeared. Keep in mind that the man who first writes the story rarely has anything to do with writing the headline. He has absolutely nothing to do with where the story appears in the paper.

If you would take a one-hour trip through the offices and production departments of a metropolitan news-

paper, you would see the complicated steps every story must follow after it leaves the typewriter of the reporter and before it appears in the paper. Every daily newspaper, large or small, welcomes visitors and will take them on conducted tours. I strongly recommend you make such a visit. It will help you understand the newspaper

likely be visited by a reporter from the local or nearby newspaper. Although you may not often have time to talk with representatives of the press, you should take the time for this first call. Your cooperation, friendship, and straightforward answers on this first visit can establish a favorable climate for all future



Indianapolis Star and News photo

Printing is the end process in editing and publishing a modern daily paper. A new product is produced every 24 hours.

business and newspapermen—and this is a prime requisite in good press relations.

You Are News to a Reporter

Most military installations are important—economically, socially, and professionally—to the community in or near which they are located. A new commander of a military installation is news. After your arrival you will

press relations within your command.

Remember, this man—or woman—is doing a job. He has been sent to get a story. He will get it from you or from someone else.

It is very unlikely that a reporter will have any idea of the scope and complexities of your command. Although he is not going to write a story on this, it is to your advantage for him to know about it.

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You should introduce him to your deputy or executive officer. Whatever you do, make him feel he always will be welcome and that your command will endeavor to help him in any way possible.

He may know your IO. If not, he should meet him. However, you must remember that a good newspaperman will not limit his newsgathering to the IO if he knows an important story is available.

You may never see this reporter again, but the courtesy you extend on this one visit can pay untold dividends.

Meet the Publisher

When you assume a new command, make one of your early duties a personal study of the local newspaper. Determine who is the dominant personality in the business. You cannot be guided by titles. There are more titles than there are offices in the newspaper industry. On one paper, the managing editor is the senior editorial officer; on another, it may be the executive editor, or just "the editor." If the publisher is active in the business, you must remember he is "the court of last resort."

How do you get this information? If there is an IO in your organization, he should know. However, let us assume this information is not available. It is logical, therefore, to assume that your headquarters has, in the past, cooperated with various local agencies such as the Chamber of Commerce and the United Fund. At your earliest convenience, invite the president of the chamber or the fund to join you for dinner. Such individuals always are well-informed on the local press.

Some time during the conversation, casually ask him about the local paper—who owns it, who is the senior edi-

torial officer, are the news columns and the editorial page supervised by the same individual? Your guest may be a personal friend of the publisher or the managing editor. If so, he could well become your best means of meeting the publisher. A golf game, a "business leaders' tour" of your post or headquarters, a reception for a visiting dignitary are all good means.

It is to your advantage—and to that of your command—that you know the key individual or individuals on the newspaper.

In many respects, a publisher or an editor lives in much the same secluded world as the Army commander. By the stroke of his typewriter the editor reaches thousands of people in the community. You, with one command, can affect the lives of the thousands who are in your command. Both you and the editor hold posts of great importance in the eyes of the public. But he will not be likely to call or visit you first. He may send a reporter, he may print your picture that was delivered to his city room by your IO, but he does not have to know you to do his job. However, should your command ever become the focal point of a critical news story, your acquaintance with him could prove invaluable.

Meeting the editor or publisher is important; but getting to know him and winning his friendship and respect are more important. At the proper time, invite him and his wife to your quarters. Ask his advice on matters that concern your command and the community. He will be flattered to know that you respect his opinion. In time, you will find that he respects yours.

When you assume a new command, it will not take long for you to determine the proficiency of your various

PRESS RELATIONS

staff officers and your subordinate commanders. You are familiar with what is expected of them; you know the standards you expect them to meet.

Your Information Officer

However, you may not be well-informed on the qualities most desirable in a good IO. For this reason, *you* should take time to evaluate him. Remember, he is going to be your senior staff officer insofar as many contacts with the community are concerned.

In your presence, have him jot down the names of the newspapers in your immediate area, and tell him to list the key executives on the papers. Ask him whom he contacts at the papers and when he was last in the newspaper offices. Have him show you the more important stories that have appeared in the last 90 or 120 days.

Ask him if he has attended the Army Information School at Fort Slocum, New York.

Do not allow yourself to be impressed by his scholarly appearance, his chatty approach to press relations, or his membership in the local public relations association or press club. While these are most desirable, they are not substitutes for proficiency. The business world is full of bright, attractive young men who have friendly smiles, speak well, and always appear neat and trim. They call themselves public relations men, but mostly they are looking for work. Some of the country's finest public relations and press relations men could not make a speech if their lives depended on it. Some are completely ill at ease at a cocktail party. But they know their job and they have won the respect of the newspapers. The city editors or the columnists have learned

by experience that their releases are correct, that they are men of their word, and that they do not twist facts or elaborate with half-truths in order to make a story.

Qualifications and Proficiency

Just what do you look for in an IO?

In glancing through the clippings he hands you, you can quickly see the type, number, and quality of articles that have appeared. If you have difficulty finding anything but promotion announcements, coverage of social functions, and stories of visiting dignitaries, you should question his operation. Any high school student with school newspaper experience can handle such routine stories.

If your command has a training mission, you should see a story or two devoted to that mission. If the community does not know what your command is doing, it should.

Just outside Indianapolis, Indiana, the Army Finance Center is located at Fort Benjamin Harrison. Stories often appear in the Indianapolis newspapers concerning the center. The business editors of the papers have written stories about the Army's pay system. The papers have carried pictures of the center's operations. They have sent reporters and photographers to the center with various business and civic groups that have been invited to tour the center. The Army Finance Center is an important business operation as far as Indianapolis is concerned. Your installation undoubtedly is very important to the community in, or near, which it is located. With your help the newspaper is your very best liaison with the community.

You must have an IO who is thoroughly familiar with all facets of your command and has the professional

know-how to determine what should be publicized.

Ask your IO how many "hometown stories" he releases a week or a month. By sending stories to hometown papers, a good IO can do wonders in building *esprit de corps* in an organization. When a soldier's picture appears in his hometown paper, it makes the soldier—and the Army—just a little more important to the hometown friends. A picture of Corporal Jones firing a weapon or instructing a small class impresses his friends. Letters of praise come to Corporal Jones from his friends and immediately he becomes a better soldier, a prouder soldier, and your command becomes the most important one in the United States Army.

Not a Personal IO

Your IO is not doing a job if he is always in his office. He cannot do his job on the telephone. He has to be on the scene, with a photographer, or with his own camera if he is proficient. He has to be looking for newsworthy stories. The good ones will not come to him.

If you are not impressed with the job being done by the IO, get a capable one immediately.

Last, but not least, explain to your IO that he is not your personal IO. As commanding officer, your picture can appear too often in both your unit publication and in the local press. Nothing will turn an alert newspaper staff against you quicker than having your picture cross the city desk too often. When you are visited by a senior commander, your IO can have a picture taken of you shaking his hand. Or, he can picture the officer talking with your trainees. The first picture may add to your family scrapbook, but the second would contribute to

your command. It probably would impress the senior officer, too.

The Press in a Crisis

Let us assume you have a good IO. Let us further assume you have made the acquaintance or even have become a close friend of the editor or publisher.

Late one morning you receive an emergency call to the effect that a number of men have been killed in a training accident. Before you have access to the facts, you are being called or faced by reporters, photographers, and press association representatives—many of them from papers out of your command radius. You are now the focal point of a story that has regional or national significance.

What do you do and say?

Before outlining a few easy-to-follow rules in such a situation, let me cite an incident which brought this problem before me in a most vivid manner.

In October 1955 a large corporation in one of our neighboring Indiana cities had a serious strike. The company is one of the country's largest manufacturers of automotive parts. It has plants in several cities.

Strikers and nonstrikers were fighting. Weapons were being carried by nonstrikers as they drove to and from work. Homes were being damaged, cars wrecked, and people beaten.

State police were unable to send sufficient troops to handle the situation. The communities asked the Governor to send National Guard troops.

As a regimental commander, I was ordered to take my regiment, plus a company of tanks and sufficient transportation, into the area to prevent further damage to property and injury to citizens.

By the time my staff and I arrived, the town was overflowing with newspaper reporters, photographers, television cameramen, and magazine writers from all parts of the country. Nearly every eastern paper of any

Above the picture was the caption, "Won't Talk."

I had two immediate questions to answer for myself. First, how would I cope with the press? Second, how could I control or at least influence



Chicago Daily News photo

Several persons in addition to the reporter work on a story before it appears. Here, the man in the slot oversees the editing, writing of headlines, and decides where the story will appear.

size was represented. Television networks had camera crews in all cities where the company had plants. A team from *Time* and *Life* were on the scene.

Sources of News

Every man in a uniform represented a news source to these reporters.

I had not anticipated such a problem, but the fact that it was a serious problem could not be overlooked.

Already, Indianapolis and several state newspapers had pictured one of my battalion commanders leaving city hall at midnight the previous night.

the comments made by any of the 2,000 troops in the command?

After making a number of initial decisions on troop dispositions, I released word that I would meet with all media representatives that evening in the city hall.

During the two or three hours preceding this meeting, I visited each of our installations and held small meetings with all officers and key non-commissioned officers. I made sure that every individual who might be considered a reliable news source knew what to say and what not to say.

Rules to Follow

The officers and men were told that any member of the command could tell any civilian who asked:

1. What he was doing (his personal mission) at the time of the interview.
2. His name, hometown, and civilian occupation.
3. Whether he was a member of a labor union. (This last question was asked of many men, I later learned.)

They were specifically told that no one would express personal opinions on the over-all mission or indicate any feeling toward either strikers or non-strikers.

Telling members of a command under such conditions that they may not talk to the press, radio, or television representatives is asking for more trouble. By giving them a reasonable rule to follow, and impressing them with the need for following the rule, you eliminate the problem that comes from a "no comment" edict. Furthermore, the press, when they find the officers and men relaxed and willing to talk to a reasonable degree, quickly lose interest in them as a source of news.

My next problem was to establish my own rule of thumb. Being in the newspaper business helped considerably. I knew it would be futile to allow myself to become irritated over anything done or said by any media representative. If a reporter can make you angry, he can make a routine assignment a page one story. You cannot think clearly and talk logically when you are disturbed—and it is imperative to do both when dealing with reporters.

As to what I would or could say, I formulated a policy which only I knew—a policy which worked well for

the 30 days we were on duty in the area.

I decided I would answer any question to the best of my ability as long as I could put the answer in the *past tense*. Any question which pertained to future plans, any questions which led to speculative replies would be answered with an "I do not know" or with "there are no changes" or a comparable comment.

Regular Press Meetings

When I met with the group that evening, there were approximately 100 reporters and photographers in the room. Newsreel cameras and television cameras also were set up.

The interview lasted most of one hour. I forced myself to relax. I even joked with some of the reporters who asked questions which were impossible to answer. I am confident that my relaxed attitude toward them contributed considerably toward the way they treated me.

When I told the group I would meet with them twice a day, once at 1000 and again at 1600, I eliminated much of the "digging" and questioning that could have occurred. Remember, if you ever are faced with a need for regular press meetings, divide them so neither the morning nor the afternoon papers will be favored.

On the third day I found it necessary to establish a curfew and to stop the sale of alcoholic beverages. This was a great inconvenience to many members of the press. At the evening press meeting, a spokesman for the group said the press and radio people objected to not being able to buy a drink. The gentleman who spoke was from a large eastern city and had been very forthright during the two or three times I had met him.

Before the others could add their

comments, I reminded the gentlemen that the troops were carrying live ammunition and that alcohol and ammunition just do not mix. "... and I am sure you would suggest I have my head examined if I did not make such a ruling," I told him.

Intentionally or unintentionally, he agreed. That was the last of that problem as far as the press was concerned.

The longer such a situation lasts, the easier it is to work with the press.

When they first come on the scene, they are all fighting for background information and facts. The first day they will ask hundreds of questions. They will follow you everywhere you go, they will decide quickly for themselves whether they can rely upon your being cooperative. If they feel you are not cooperative or that you are not giving them facts that are available, they will turn to other sources for their information. Rest assured, they will get their story, either factually from you or second and third-hand from others.

Feature Stories

As the days pass, and the urgency of the situation is reduced, those who remain will be looking for human interest stories and similar feature material. Even these stories may bother you, if you let them.

At the end of the first week a group of church women came to me and asked if they could continue with plans for a fish fry the Friday night of the second week. I assured them that there would be no problem as long as the city remained quiet and orderly and asked them to check with me 48 hours prior to the event. They were pleased and evidently felt the answer was a reasonable one.

As they left the building, they were met by a feature writer of a large

newspaper syndicate. The next day the papers represented by this reporter carried the headline—COLONEL CANCELS CHURCH FISH FRY. This clever gentleman had asked the women how much fish had to be ordered, how long it took to clean and fry the fish, and concluded that it could not be done in 48 hours.

To take offense at such reporting is to ask for more problems.

Guide List

Were I to recommend a personal guide list for a commander faced with a major news break, I would list:

1. Give factual answers—or say you do not know. If the question involves a matter under consideration, say so and assure reporters that you will give them the answer just as quickly as you have it. Do not be afraid to say you do not know if you honestly do not know!

2. Keep yourself as the primary source of information. Remember, a good reporter covering a major story wants his facts from the principal person involved. That most likely would be you. However, if you do delegate this mission to your IO or other senior officer, be prepared to give him the latitude and backing necessary to do the job.

3. Do not issue a blanket order forbidding anyone in your command from talking to the press. In the first place it is impossible to enforce. Second, it only spurs good reporters, convincing them there may be more to the situation than really exists. Third, it is not necessary.

4. Try to understand the job confronting the reporters and photographers. They are being paid to get the news. Some will be easier to talk with than others, but you have found this to be true in all walks of life.

5. Above all, do not lose your temper. When you are angry, you will unintentionally say things you do not really mean to say. A sense of humor is invaluable in a crisis. This does not mean you should make light of the situation or the questions asked, neither does it mean you should try to substitute jokes for facts. But an understanding smile often quiets a stormy conversation.

6. Last, do not fight the clippings. You cannot "unprint" what has already appeared in the papers, so do not try. Often, statements and even stories that infuriate you are not investigated by the reading public. But the next time you attack the reporter or the newspaper through another medium, you will get public attention. Of course, there are exceptions. When you feel an exception exists, when your honesty and integrity—and that of your command—is jeopardized, you should emphasize your position. However, do it with dignity. Never allow your voice or your words to indicate animosity. This only makes little fires big and big ones bigger.

Your personal friendship with the local publisher and your close cooperation with the local press can prove invaluable in such a crisis. Out-of-town newspapermen rely heavily on the advice of local reporters. If word passes that you always have been co-

operative and fair with the press, it will have far-reaching effect on the over-all situation.

Conclusion

Press relations has become a profession. Business and industry spend millions of dollars annually to be sure their image is presented favorably to the American public. However, I know of no one instance where a trained public relations or press relations man has been as successful in influencing the press in his own community as the company president or chairman of the board—if that executive has taken the time and gone to the trouble to do the job.

Just as the president or board chairman can influence the press in his area directly, you—the senior commander of a United States Army installation—can and should do the same. However, you cannot do this unless you have an understanding of and an appreciation for the problems facing the reporter, the photographer, the editor, or the publisher. You cannot do this unless you consider it important to meet and learn to know the individual or individuals who own and operate the daily newspaper in your area.

The recommendations herein are not complicated and are not very time consuming. However, they have worked for many—and they will work for you.

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WHAT IT TAKES: ESSENTIALS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Major Thoun Htaik, *Burma Army*

UNCONVENTIONAL warfare demands unconventional thinking. What follows are some ideas for those who would want to counter the unconventional elements and guerrillas in any country. They are unconventional ideas; they may seem erratic to those unable to think beyond the narrow grooves of conventional training; they may even be revolting to those for whom unquestioning obedience is all-important.

But let us start with the assumption that, when one is faced with a ruthless and unscrupulous enemy, it is courting disaster to talk about chivalry, about international law, about Geneva Conventions. True, the ends do not always justify the means, but it is equally true that very often they do, especially in this world of *Realpolitik*. More often than not it is the results which count rather than what and how you do it. Accomplishment of mission is important for any military commander, but for the Special Forces commander this should be the overriding factor to which he should subordinate everything else. For him an assigned mission is an ultimate goal. He cannot afford to fail: a Special Forces commander with a record of failures has lost his usefulness.

To say that the end may justify the means does not necessarily mean that one must employ dirty or underhanded methods. It merely means that in the execution of orders, intelligent inter-

pretation and vigorous application are essential. Blind obedience has no place here. *Befehl ist Befehl* (order is order) surely will lead to disaster in special operations.

Qualities

A Special Forces commander may seem to be deviating from the path that would logically be taken by those who are carrying out the order "to the letter." Indeed, he may even violate the order when there is no other way of accomplishing his mission than to embark upon a course of action that inevitably involves breach of orders. Yet in so doing he may well be doing exactly what his superior would want him to do, but due to the nature of the operations could not foresee.

Surely, no one will question the importance of obedience in military discipline. And there should be no exception to the principle of obedience to orders—although it would always be more appropriate and useful to speak of *intelligent* obedience to orders. In this respect the problem of the independently operating subordinate can be made easier by giving mission-type orders, leaving wide latitude to the subordinate in carrying out his mission. Tell him **WHAT** to do and not **HOW**. Thus we can eliminate the element of "disobedience with good intention."

The relationship of Field Marshal (then General) Sir William Slim and

General Stilwell in the Burma Campaign is illuminating here. Stilwell, although he was at that time Commander in Chief of the Chinese forces in Burma, Commanding General of the (US) China-Burma-India Theater and also Deputy Supreme Commander of the (Combined) Southeast Asia Command, had agreed to put himself under the operational control of Gen-

Unconventional Leaders

Stilwell was indeed the kind of unconventional soldier who is most successful in special operations. It is hardly a coincidence that almost all the known experts in this type of warfare are themselves unconventional in the truest sense of the word. Orde Wingate, for instance, reputedly kept a grease-stained tunic around to put



The late General Joseph W. Stilwell and his staff's retreat from Burma

eral Slim until his (Stilwell's) forces got to Kamaing, in northern Burma. Slim, the (British) 14th Army Commander, knowing Stilwell's temperament, gave as few orders as possible. When Stilwell was about to pass from Slim's command he said to him: "Well, General, I've been a good subordinate to you. I obeyed all your orders!" To which Slim retorted: "Yes, you old devil, but only because the few I did give you were the ones you wanted!"

on at the special occasions when he would meet senior officers, as a way to show his indifference to them. He was laughed at and scorned when he vehemently expounded his unconventional theories.

Lawrence of Arabia, a nonconformist in more than one way, was similarly criticized when he refused to attack the Turks on the traditional lines and resorted to guerrilla fighting. But Lawrence had shrewdly per-

ceived that the enemy's weakest link was supplies and that the Arabs' main objective, therefore, had to be the war materials which were so scarce and precious in the Turkish Army. With uncanny appreciation, Lawrence saw that, in the face of an enemy with overwhelming manpower but relatively few supplies, one must strike at the supplies. Ironically, if in such a situation one seeks to reduce the enemy's troop strength, this even ameliorates his problems because he will have fewer mouths to feed. On the other hand, if you cut his supply lines and if you destroy his stores, you are hitting him where it hurts the most.

Excessive control and centralized supervision are difficult to reconcile with such operations. An illustration of this may be seen in the tragic raid on Tobruk by the British during World War II. The plan originally was to raid Tobruk by Commandos with the help of Long-Range Desert Groups. As this plan was reviewed by higher headquarters, it was modified successively and air, naval, and marine elements were added to the original Commandos. Eventually, there evolved the concept of an amphibious raid together with a ground attack by Com-

mandos. Yet the whole operation ended in failure: The high-level plan proved too rigid in operation.

So the first essential in special type operations is to choose commanders who have, above anything else, abundant qualities of resourcefulness, initiative, and quickness of decision, and to give them the widest latitude in the execution of their missions.

Importance of Special Training

Thorough special training is another essential. By special training is meant that type which would yield best results in a particular area under particular conditions. Needless to say, the area in which troops are trained should, as nearly as possible, resemble the area in which you are going to operate. Thus Wingate's training at Ramgarh paid good results in Burmese jungles. In this sense each unit for special operations needs unique training for each particular operation. The nature of this training will depend upon the unit, and upon time and facilities available. Some military figures (including some fairly prominent ones) hold that Special Forces are superfluous and wasteful, and that they are detrimental to *esprit de corps*. This is a question that can be argued either way. Rather, one needs to bear in mind that this is an age of specialization and that amateurs are always bound to fail when pitted against specialists. The truth of this conclusion was borne out time and again by brilliant successes of Special Forces units in World War II.

Let me give a few examples of special training that proved successful. Before the raid on Tobruk, the British brought in some military personnel who were fluent in German—most of them natives of Germany who had become refugees from that country.

Major Thoun Htaik, Burma Army, was graduated in June from the 1960-61 Regular Course of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He was commissioned in the Burma Defence Army in 1944. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Rangoon University and trained at The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. Commissioned in the Burma Army in 1953, he has served in the Defence Services Academy, May Myo, Burma. His article, "Encirclement Methods in Antiguerrilla Warfare" appeared in the June 1961 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.

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These men were given special training by German-speaking officers. They always wore real German issue uniforms, even to their underwear and socks; any cigarettes or chocolate they carried were German; and they were not allowed to speak to their officers except in German. When they marched it was in the German manner, with hands swinging across the body, and

and talked as if they were part of the United States Army.

The second essential in special operations is the training peculiar to each operation and its particular conditions. The unit and the men must not only be equipped and armed to suit the type of raid or operation, but the composition of the unit also should be tailored to the special needs and the



Guerrillas in training

they saluted in the fashion of the German Army. Eventually, these men—acting and, indeed, almost feeling themselves to be German soldiers—passed through the gates of Tobruk, completely deceiving the enemy at the gates. Comparable training had been received by Skorzeny's raiders who operated behind the United States lines during the Battle of the Bulge: They were not only attired but acted

training be designed for the particular occasion.

Exploitation of Local Guerrillas

Last, but by no means least, guerrillas should be exploited to the fullest. Current doctrine taught at US service schools is that success of military plans should never be made dependent upon the accomplishment of missions assigned to the guerrillas. This approach is, of course, based entirely on

conventional military thinking; to me, as a citizen and soldier of an Asian nation, it carries an implication of lack of appreciation of the potential of guerrillas.

It is true that it is an ideal not to depend upon foreign elements and carry success by one's own forces alone. It is also true that US troops are likely to be far better equipped and better trained and armed than the guerrillas. But this is no reason to underestimate the guerrillas. When you are facing an enemy who exploits guerrillas to the fullest in areas most suitable for guerrilla warfare, and who regards guerrillas as one major element of his armed forces, this underestimation of guerrillas may bring disastrous results. In many places it has already brought such results. Perhaps the best example here is the recent Cuban debacle. It has been reported that great reliance was placed upon a popular uprising against Fidel Castro and that the invasion itself was undertaken to take pressure off the guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains. Yet it is also reported that nothing was done to get full cooperation of the local guerrillas. This lack of cooperation between the invasion forces and the local guerrillas was, in

all likelihood, one of the causes of the failure of the whole venture.

The third essential of special operations is, then, the fullest utilization of friendly guerrillas whenever they are present. It should be added that even where they are not present, if there is any sign of guerrilla potential, trusted indigenous people should be organized and trained as guerrillas. Whenever possible, these guerrilla activities should be well-coordinated by Special Forces liaison teams who live and fight with the local guerrillas. It also would be a great advantage for a regular soldier to turn into and fight as a guerrilla whenever cut off or purposely left behind the enemy lines by his unit.

Summary

Essentials of special operations may be summarized briefly as follows:

1. Leaders for special operations should be chosen for their resourcefulness, initiative, and quickness of decision.
2. Each special operation needs unique training, equipment, weapons, and organization specially tailored for the particular undertaking.
3. Unconventional forces should make maximum use of friendly guerrillas.

... I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of nonnuclear war, paramilitary operations and sublimated or unconventional wars. . . .

... our special forces and unconventional warfare units will be increased and reoriented. Throughout the services new emphasis must be placed on the special skills and languages which are required to work with local populations in all the social, economic, psychological, governmental, and other efforts that are short of open conflict but necessary to counter Communist-sponsored guerrillas or insurgents.

President John F. Kennedy

Documents of the German Army

Warrant Officer Walter J. E. Bodling, *United States Army*

A UNIQUE opportunity to study recent military and political history is available to soldiers and scholars studying in the United States. Substantial portions of the World War II records of the German Army are now available on microfilm in the World War II Records Division of the National Archives at Alexandria, Virginia. The story of these records begins in the heat of combat, more than 17 years ago.

Never before had the United States Army captured such vast amounts of records of a major foreign power as it did during World War II. Nor had the United States ever faced so strong and formidable an enemy as Hitler Germany, which made war on practically the whole world. When German generals signed the unconditional surrender at Reims and in Berlin, a war machinery unequaled in history in its totalitarian and all-embracing grip on each individual within its sphere of influence, and on every facet of national life of many nations, finally collapsed. This total defeat apparently came somewhat unexpectedly to the German custodians of the records that documented this gigantic struggle, for despite unequivocal orders to the contrary, many records were allowed to survive.

During the past 15 years they have given not only evidence of the sinister schemes of Nazi Germany to conquer the world, but have, paradoxically, served to give the Western World an unexpected windfall of information.

These millions of pages of military and nonmilitary captured documents contain data on countless military, political, scientific, sociological, and other subjects that have taken on growing importance only during the past decade.

Records captured in combat on the European and North African fronts were first sent to the Military Intelligence Research Section, with branches in Washington, D. C. and London. There they were screened and analyzed without delay. Military linguists produced intelligence data of immense value in the continuing prosecution of the war against Nazi Germany, and in the formulation of policies and plans for military government operations in German territory that was soon to be occupied.

Division of Captured Records

Upon the termination of hostilities in Europe those records already in the hands of the Allies, and additional quantities becoming available through intense searches, were placed under the control of the United States and the United Kingdom. They became the subject of formal agreements providing for the joint administration and safekeeping of all captured records both in the United States and abroad. Plans were made for the postwar coordination of all matters affecting custody, preservation, and exploitation; and general rules were laid down governing access to these records. Also, the two nations fixed their major areas of interest: Naval and air rec-

ords as well as those of the German Foreign Office were to be held and controlled by the British; German Army, high command, ministerial, and other records, already in American hands, were to remain there.

This division of captured records was to facilitate the screening and evaluation for subsequent exploitation, and a most thorough examination of many aspects of the war that had raged over Europe for nearly six years. It probably was not quite foreseeable at that time that the intelligence community and military historians were to be the prime beneficiaries of such investigations. Certainly, any reasonable estimates of the value of these captured German documents have long been exceeded.

"Total War" Depicted

Much purely military information was to be extracted and is still being culled from the records. They have proved to be universally useful to the strategist, the tactician, and the logistician, for they illustrate what the Germans chose to call "total war." They depict a gigantic war effort embracing the military services, the homefront, foreign military and civilian auxiliaries, and, last but not least, the unprecedented and most unrelenting subjugation of oppressed peoples, persecuted minorities, and innocent noncombatants. The picture of total war could not have been painted in

Warrant Officer Walter J. E. Bodling is on orders to Okinawa where he will be assigned to the United States Army, Ryukyu Islands/IX Corps. He served with the 3d Infantry, followed by an assignment to the Department of the Army in 1951 as a linguist. He was Sergeant Major of the Captured Records Section, The Adjutant General's Office, from 1957 to 1960.

a more dramatic fashion than it is in these journals and combat reports.

American military men may learn much from these records, particularly from those describing the war in the Soviet Union. This campaign began with a rapid sweep across the border toward the environs of Moscow and into the Caucasus Mountains, and it ended with a murderous retreat from



All German documents are put on microfilm for permanent file before they are returned to Germany

the Ukraine, from White Russia, and from the Baltic States to the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin.

All the classic maneuvers of offense and defense are shown vividly as are their innumerable variations, as dictated by circumstance and exploited brilliantly by imaginative commanders, or forfeited by incompetents. Equally well-documented are the direction of the munitions industry, and political and administrative controls forced on the "homefront" in support of the armies in the field.

Contemporary German military historians have done considerable work in attempting to fill the gap in German military histories and analyses of World War II. But they have given account, mostly, of selected campaigns, outstanding units, or of some of the better-known military leaders only. The United States military history program has contributed a number of studies based on the captured documents and it also has incorporated material gleaned from these documents in the series on the *United States Army in World War II*. A number of manuscripts of secondary interest have been assembled and retained for reference use.

The original German records, comprising war journals, combat reports, maps, and a multitudinous mass of related papers—in which commanders noted with meticulous care each major and minor event throughout the war—have been in the United States since 1945. They describe the Polish campaign which set off World War II; the invasions of Scandinavia, France, and the Low Countries; the attack on the Balkans; the assault on the Soviet Union which was to end in such catastrophe; the North African exploits of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel; and, finally, operations on the Allied invasion fronts in Italy and Western Europe. The many varied experiences of military units are recorded in such realistic detail that one cannot help but marvel at the thoroughness of German recorders, at the good fortune that befell the Allies in capturing such records intact, and at the wisdom in preserving them.

Some Gaps Exist

The captured military records include files of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (an agency roughly equiv-

alent to the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff), the *Oberkommando des Heeres* (Army Chief of Staff) and the general and special staffs, and of the field army from army group level down to the division. They further include records of the occupation forces and of the replacement army in Germany proper. These records cover nearly every aspect of prewar planning, mobilization, and actual operations in Europe and North Africa during the Second World War.

While the essential records of most of the higher headquarters are fully extant, some lower echelon units' files are not without occasional gaps resulting from the loss of papers in the field, or from the inability or futility of keeping records in the first place. The few more substantial gaps in some collections were caused by a fire which spread to the Potsdam German Army Archives, destroying many records. Speaking from an over-all point of view, much valuable, in fact irreplaceable, record material has survived and is being preserved for posterity.


Available for Unofficial Research

In addition to army records, the captured German documents include much material from nonmilitary agencies and organizations, notably the so-called Himmler-Collection, a mass of records of the SS and Gestapo machinery that controlled the state and the people. All of these documents have been in Washington since they were brought to this country after V-E Day. Formerly in the custody of the War Department's Military Intelligence Division, they were transferred to the Office of The Adjutant General in 1947.

Having been utilized for official pur-

poses by many agencies of the United States Government, they now are available for unofficial research. These military documents, plus several thousand cubic feet of records of governmental, Nazi Party, and private agencies and organizations of the Third Reich, have been primary sources of information for countless studies, re-

repute or doubtful competence, had the personnel files of German Army officers, captured intact, not been made available to the Federal Defense Ministry at an early stage during the formation of the new German Army. British, Canadian, and New Zealand official war histories have relied heavily on the original German war jour-



One area of the World War II Records Division files contains personnel records of key persons on the German staff

ports, research projects, and investigations. Legal history was made during the Nürnberg trials of the major war criminals when the prosecution established prima-facie evidence with the accused men's own files.


The Bundeswehr—West Germany's contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization armed forces—might well be led by officers of ill

nals and operations studies as have those published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, especially its series, *German Military Operations in World War II*.

A national news magazine not long ago pointed to the accumulated data on Iron Curtain countries contained in captured German files. This data provided much of the basic intelli-

ence on the Sino-Soviet bloc until high altitude reconnaissance over the Soviet Union, discontinued in 1960, became feasible. It is no secret that German armies advancing deep into Soviet territory during World War II had collected any and all types of information and that such information was extremely well-documented. Much

ords on land warfare in Eastern Europe. They illustrate the peculiarities of that campaign and the invaders' mounting difficulties with the many environmental effects found there. These hazards created by nature included the icy blizzards that had doomed Napoleon in 1812 as they were to seal the fate of General Friedrich



Archivists at work in the Himmler, SS, and German Police files of the Records Division

of this intelligence was contained in the files captured by the Western Allies. Even though some records were lost to the Red Army in East Germany, and some unknown quantities were destroyed at the last minute by diehard Germans, substantial footages fell into Allied hands.

Of particular interest are the rec-

Paulus in the winter of 1942-43; and the vastness of the terrain itself, that compelled battalions to take and hold what the manual had described as divisional or even corps sectors.

The armored thrusts that had slashed through an unwary France suddenly bogged down in seas of Russian mud. The hobnail boots that had

resounded in the Champs Elysees victory parade became, overnight, frozen stovepipes seemingly weighing a ton. And the traditional *Kommiss* bread—standard fare of the German soldier in peace and war—often appeared better suited as a projectile to be hurled at the enemy in close combat than to fill the stomachs of wet, shivering, and hungry riflemen. The German General Staff that had optimistically drawn up an elaborate “statement of objectives to be pursued upon completion of the Russian campaign” as early as July 1941, all but disintegrated when an entire army was lost at Stalingrad. Yes, these records bear silent witness to the calamities of the Russian war, to a chaos the like of which no military commander had ever experienced. Indeed, the captured German records are a monumental collection of data on modern war, on a world struggle of the first order.

Linguists of the Office of The Adjutant General, who had cataloged these enemy documents and rendered assistance in their prompt exploitation, have reviewed all the German files during the past four years to remove security restrictions to the maximum extent possible. Actual downgrading actions were authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Obviously, some records containing still sensitive intelligence information are part of this collection. The need for continued protection of such data, and current military-political considerations prompted by the tensions of the cold war, were decisive factors in these reviews and have served to maintain a security classification over some small parts.

As a result of an intensive screening, some 9,000 cubic feet of captured

military records alone have been regraded to unclassified and may now be examined by any researcher. For those not familiar with cubic foot measurements, let it suffice to say that, stacked singly atop one another, these records would reach the height of 17 Washington monuments, one foot square.

The National Archives, now the custodian of these records, applies standard rules of admission. This means that the records may be seen, by persons not acting in an official capacity, on the premises only. There are adequate facilities to permit visitors to examine the records after they have made their selections from shelf lists and card catalogs. It should be noted that United States Army records from the World War II period are housed in the same building and are administered by the same division within the National Archives organization.*

The original German records will not be retained in the United States indefinitely, as a restitution program for all unclassified German records has been in effect for some time. Records that have been exploited for official purposes by all interested Government agencies are made available, by The Adjutant General, for return to Germany. They are shipped to the *Bundesarchiv* (West German Federal Archives) at Koblenz, Germany, for ultimate retirement. Substantial quantities of such records have already been dispatched.

In order to preserve permanently in the United States copies of those records that are being returned to Germany, a microfilming program is being undertaken jointly by the Office

* Prospective visitors are advised to phone or write in advance of their visits to the Chief Archivist, World War II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, King and Union Streets, Alexandria, Virginia.

of The Adjutant General, the National Archives, and the American Historical Association. It is designed to reproduce on microfilm all those records that have historical or other significance. Determinations as to historical import are being made primarily by a staff of scholars engaged by the American Historical Association who are working within the World

During the past three years over eight million pages of German records have been so microfilmed. A person unable to visit the National Archives, but wishing to consult the German records, may purchase microfilm copies after having made his selections from the *Guides to Captured Records Microfilmed at Alexandria*. These *Guides* have been prepared by the



The bulk of German World War II records are being returned. Final check of cartons containing documents is made prior to shipment.—US Army photos.

War II Records Division of the National Archives. Extensive financial support for this undertaking has been received in the form of grants from the Avalon, Ford, and Old Dominion Foundations, and from the Lilly Endowment. All microfilms produced under this arrangement remain the property of the United States but copies may be purchased by anyone.

American Historical Association and are published by the National Archives. Copies have been distributed to colleges and universities throughout the United States. A limited number of individual *Guides* is still obtainable from the Exhibits and Publications Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington 25, D. C.

"What is Past is Prologue"—no less in matters affecting the American soldier than in any other undertaking in national life. In general or limited war, modern technological advances notwithstanding, it will be the Army's mission to take and hold enemy territory in our defense against foreign aggression. That territory may well be on the European Continent, and

where else can one learn to accomplish such a mission if not from the records of those who were there?

It was with this thought in mind that the Army embarked on so ambitious a program, joining forces with the National Archives, and the American Historical Association. The fruits of their labors may affect military science for many years to come.

Gift Subscriptions

Do you have a friend in the military service you would like to give a small professional gift? Send him a paid subscription to the *Military Review*.

Brigadier General Roland H. del Mar, commanding the Antilles Command, United States Army, Caribbean, from time to time sends a gift subscription to a junior officer he would like to help along in the military profession, or to an allied officer to promote a mutual understanding of the military problems of the Free World.

General del Mar, who recently commanded Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division, believes that military journals must be read to make the field manuals live. It is the duty of the senior officer, he feels, to guide the younger officers in their professional development, by encouragement and example.




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POLITICAL CONTROL

IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY

Dr. S. M. Chiu



THE frustrating experience of the Laotian and Vietnamese Armies in fighting the Communist guerrillas has led many people to ask why the Communist guerrillas seem able to fight so much more effectively than the better-armed government armies. Many factors influence the effectiveness of a fighting force. There is one obvious distinction which may provide the answer in this case. The Communist officers and men are indoctrinated, disciplined, and controlled by a pervasive political apparatus to which every minute of the officers' or the men's lives is accountable, and by which the officers and men are conditioned to respond to the wishes of the party in the way it wants them.

To the Communists, war is not a match of arms alone but a competition of human and psychological factors. It is the political control apparatus that is responsible for the

harnessing of these factors by instilling in the soldiers the will to fight and the desire to win, by demoralizing the enemy and encouraging him to defect, and by winning the sympathy if not outright support of the civilian population.

Presumably, the political control system in the Communist guerrilla armies in Southeast Asia is similar to that in the Chinese Communist Army. Since information on the Communist guerrillas is still lacking, an examination of the Chinese Communist system may be instructive.

The political control system in the Chinese Communist Army is as old as the army itself. It was first introduced into the National Revolutionary Army in the 1920's by Russian advisors. Later, it was inherited by the embryonic Red Army of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, composed of survivors of several abortive Communist upris-

ings in 1927. The system differed from its Soviet counterpart only in that it has, up to the present time, placed more emphasis on control of the men than of the officers.

Theoretically, the control system aims at preserving what Chu Teh called the "five harmonies": between army units, between officers and men, between army and government, between army and party, and between army and civilians. In simple language, the purpose of political control is the complete subordination to the party of the entire army, making it ever responsive to the party's call to action, whether it be railway building, foreign intervention, or hog raising.

Communist China considers the army merely an arm of the party—and hence of the state. To erode the army's separate identity a sustained process emphasizes political education and psychological conditioning rather than outright elimination of the intransigent. The Chinese Communists believe that by this process of continuous "remolding," officers and men alike can be made instantly responsive to party commands. Army

Dr. S. M. Chiu is on the staff of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. A native of China, he was educated in the United States and received his Ph. D. degree from the University of Southern California in 1958. He was assigned to the University of Southern California on the United States Air Force Human Resources Research Institute project during 1952-53, and was Assistant Professor of History at Centenary College of Louisiana, Shreveport, Louisiana. His article, "Chinese Communist Military Leadership," appeared in the March 1960 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.

personnel are exposed constantly to a limited number of theses such as "the army is the army of the people." By the use of a combination of intimidation and incentives soldiers of all ranks are expected to become "ideal Communists" who will react to stimuli as the party desires.

Structural Organization

Structurally, the system of control consists of a hierarchy of party committees paralleling army unit commands (party branch on the company level, and cell in the platoon), and a hierarchy of political departments which are integral parts of the army command on all levels. Between these two hierarchies are the political commissars (*Cheng Wei*) attached to all units down to the company level. On the battalion level the commissar is known as the *Ying Chiao Tao Yuan*; on the company level *Lien Chih Tao Yuan* (*Politruc* in Soviet Army). Each platoon has a political cadre and each squad a political "warrior."

As is expected, the party committees are the highest authorities in planning and policymaking within their own jurisdictional spheres, subject only to higher party organizations. It is mandatory for the army to carry out their decisions through the unit commands and the political departments.

Functioning under the veil of semi-secrecy, the party committees maintain a firm grip on party members and nonmembers in the units under their jurisdiction, both through their power to take disciplinary action against errant members, and through control over promotion, demotion, and transfers of all personnel. Party committees initiate or transmit policies handed down from above, discuss them at party conferences, and then refer them to the unit command for execution

through the political commissar. The unit command may then pass these policy decisions on to the lower units to be discussed.

Prepared by party "activists" in advance, the lower units are expected to adopt these policies as if by voluntary democratic action. This is what the Communists call "following the mass line." This control by party committees is reinforced by the political commissars, who, as party representatives in the units, are solely responsible for the execution of party policies and are vested with the authority to question and to correct all activities of the units to which they are assigned.

This presents a dualistic organizational framework which has tempted many to speculate on the possibility of conflicts between the military and political personnel. In the Chinese Army, however, it appears unlikely that the commissars are, or ever have been, empowered to countermand purely military orders as their Russian counterparts were in the early days of the Soviet Red Army. The commissar and the military commander are in practice equals, responsible to the party committee for political and military affairs respectively. Conflicts between them may, however, arise from matters that are not clearly under the jurisdiction of either. In this eventuality, the issue is referred to the party committee, and to the military committee of the central committee of the party, if necessary.

At the present stage, serious conflict is avoided by the fact that all ranking officers of a particular unit are, at the same time, members of the party committee of the same level of which the commissar is secretary. Because the very career of the com-

mander may depend on the good will of the commissar in his capacity as party committee secretary, deference to the latter is to be expected.

Political Departments

The actual implementation of party policies is the function of political departments. The top-level general political department for the entire army, which is responsible to the Politburo but administratively attached to the Ministry of National Defense, has eight divisions: organization, cultural affairs, propaganda, civilian relations, security, youth work, army postal service, and general affairs. It controls the hierarchy of political departments from the front armies down. At lower levels, however, the political departments may be simplified in organization by merging related functions such as cultural affairs and propaganda under one section.

Of special interest is the security division which is officially in charge of intelligence and counterespionage, probably only for internal security against possible enemies of the party. It is not known whether this division is staffed by external secret police personnel, but its function probably is limited to that of ferreting out and identifying subversive elements through a network of spies and informers. One observer has asserted that the political "warriors" in the squads were often used by the company commissar as informers to keep tab on other squad members. Coercive measures apparently are entrusted to the regular army command.

Company Political Officer

The key to the entire system is the company political officer because in him are concentrated all the responsibilities of political education and be-

cause he is in contact with the men at all times. Here is what Mao Tse-tung (*Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*) said about the company political officer in 1928:

The system of party representatives has been proved indispensable, particularly at the company level. . . . [The party representative] is to promote political training of soldiers . . . direct mass movements. . . . The facts tell us that whichever company has an able political officer is the best company.

Assisted by his deputy and a cultural officer, the company political officer keeps the men in his company under constant surveillance, and directs all their off-duty activities through the company club (called by various names at different times) and its seven committees: study, production, sanitation, evaluation, amusement, athletics, and bulletin.

With the possible exception of the athletic and sanitation committees, all of these have an obvious bearing on political control. Thus the study committee is in charge of the political and cultural studies of the men. The production committee directs the men to contribute to their own living thus easing the burden on the people (ostensibly to improve army-civilian relations) and the government. The evaluation committee directs specially appointed members of the squads to evaluate merits and demerits in the performance of duty. This latter is done regularly, even in the heat of battle, to serve as a means of encouragement or as a lesson for recalcitrants.

The actual operation of the control system is even more pervasive than the structural organization described above indicates. According to the Com-

munist, it is not enough to be proficient in combat or superior in physical strength in order to be a good soldier. He must have what Chu Teh called "intelligent understanding," which includes political consciousness, a certain level of literacy, and the espousal of the labor point of view. Plainly, these qualities can be so flexibly interpreted as to encompass a wide range of activities of the men. The method used to create intelligent understanding is conditioning through indoctrination and "habituation" through direct participation.

Cultural Programs

In peacetime, literacy programs occupy a good part of the time of the men. Prior to 1949, literacy programs for the army were sporadic, but even so the American reporter Harrison Forman observed in 1945 that over 80 percent of an army stationed near Yen-an, the wartime Communist base, could read newspapers. Beginning in 1949, a more intensive program was initiated—first in Manchuria, then in other parts of the country. Spectacular results were claimed by the Communists. It should be noted, however, that the program has been conducted by political officers who are actually instructed to combine "cultural" with political studies. At present, literacy programs aim at making all army men the equivalents of junior high school graduates.

Besides these so-called cultural studies, strictly political education is regular fare for the men in the form of daily political lectures by their commissars, and group discussions on current affairs within the framework of Communist ideology, government policies, the history of the Red Army, and the history of the Communist revolution. Through these discussions

the men are reminded constantly of the "traditions" of the army, which they are enjoined to uphold by cultivating a voluntary urge to participate in the many campaigns launched or instigated by the party and government. Thus in 1949 the entire army joined the newly founded Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, an organization to strengthen cultural ties be-



Everywhere the Chinese Communists turn they are confronted by propaganda posters

tween Communist China and the Soviet Union, giving it the intimidating support of the army.

Troop Entertainment

Peacetime control may be exerted also through entertainment for the troops. Hundreds of cultural troupes, musical contingents, motion-picture groups, and a broadcasting network are controlled by a department of the general political department called the cultural work division; of these, the

cultural troupes seem to be the most fully developed. Apparently, these troupes travel among army units staging plays with heavy political dosages based on themes well-known or related to the personal experience of the unsophisticated soldiers. Between their visits, the bulletin and amusement committees of local company clubs publish news stories, instructional and propaganda songs, or mobilize local talent to entertain the troops.

In time of war, control is augmented by additional indoctrination to prepare the men psychologically to meet the demands for sacrifice and what the Communists call "revolutionary heroism." This additional process begins with recruitment and mobilization with melodramatic fanfare followed by inculcation of hatred for the enemy, and ends with review meetings during and after campaigns to evaluate the performance of individuals and units.

Prior to 1955 soldiers were recruited on a "voluntary" basis. This was made necessary by the fluidity of areas under Communist control before 1949. To attract desirable elements, or any at all, to the colors, therefore, the Communists have had first to destroy the traditional image of the soldiers, which was none too complimentary, and then to raise the soldiering profession to a level of respectability by persistent propaganda. This job lay within the province of the political workers in the army. Even now, when military service is obligatory, similar methods still are employed.

Hate the Enemy

Once in the army, the men are methodically led to develop "political and class consciousness" by helping

them recall the alleged exploitation in the pre-Communist society. This is done by selecting, or more accurately, "fabricating" (the Communists actually use the term *Chih Tsao* which means "to make") "typical cases" (*Tien Hsing*) These "models" or "types" who supposedly have suffered the most from the enemy at hand (whoever it may be) act as catalysts. They are carefully coached to tell at mass accusatory meetings emotion-charged stories designed to arouse their listeners to search their own memories for incidents in their lives to match the drama revealed by the "types." The themes of these stories then are referred to the units for small group discussions, and the common experience presumably is channeled to a common hatred of the enemy.

In battle, the conduct of the men is evaluated constantly. For distinguished service one may be rewarded the title "hero" who is emulated in *Li Kung* (to render meritorious service) campaigns. Many things can make "heroes" of the men, such as economical use of weapons or labor-saving methods in digging trenches. One of the most publicized "heroes" was Wei Lai-kuo who is supposed to have killed almost 400 enemy soldiers with his rifle, and for years after the civil war still told of his exploits at political meetings in the army.

If mistakes are found in "post mortems," a rectification campaign may be in order, spreading to the entire army if serious ideological faults are found to exist (such as looting and war weariness). Moreover, the army is not immune from the periodic party "purification campaigns." These are launched with each change in party lines; or, as has happened many times

since 1942, when so-called contradictions exist, often as a result of the expansion of party membership and the consequent inclusion of diverse nonproletarian elements.

More recently, a general "study" campaign was again launched to bring the entire country into step with party lines. In the army this campaign revolved around the study of Mao's call for "correct handling of contradictions within the ranks of the people." It has since burgeoned into the so-called "Two-anti" and "Five-Good" campaigns (Two-anti: antiwaste, anticonservatism; Five-Good: good at study, good at taking care of arms, equipment, and public property, good at production, good at eliminating accidents, and good at physical training) to make the army men both "Red" and "expert."

Psychological Tactics

In addition to these intra-army controls, Communist policies toward Prisoners of War and civilian liaison work also are part of the control system. The former do not, of course, stem from humanitarian considerations, but are designed to destroy enemy morale. By the claim that the Communists have always accorded preferential treatment to Prisoners of War, their propaganda had telling effects in China's civil wars, especially among the Manchurian Army in Shensi province when Chiang Kai-shek was held briefly in captivity in late 1936.

Mao Tse-tung reported in 1928 that soldiers captured by the Communists were given the choice between staying with the Red Army or, with traveling allowances, returning home or to their own lines. Young officers usually were given two or three weeks of indoctrination and then given the same choice. It would not be surprising to find

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many captives baffled by this seeming leniency, since they had been led to believe that the Communists had no mercy for Prisoners of War. Therefore, even those who chose to return to their own lines inevitably spread stories of their experience thus sowing the seeds of disunity and defection.

In the 1930's when the Communists were blockaded by the Manchurian Army of Chang Hsueh-liang and other

fighting front to sing patriotic songs that appealed to the Manchurians. Night after night, wailing voices, aided by the autumnal winds of the northwest, penetrated into the positions of the Manchurian armies. It does not seem unlikely that this helped disaffect them from the national government.

Civilian Relations

Civilian relations work (*Chun Min Kuan Hsi*) aims at uniting the army



Chinese Communist troops join in a reading and discussion session based on the writings of Mao Tse-tung

government troops in Shensi, the Communists used similar psychological warfare tactics. Knowing that the Manchurian soldiers wanted to fight only Japanese troops who had occupied their northeastern homeland in 1931, the Communists sent groups of political workers to the hills close to the

with the people. The twin objectives of civilian relations are to maintain discipline in the army vis-à-vis the civilian population, and to muster popular support for the army. The often-quoted "Three Disciplinary Rules" and the "Eight Points of Attention," evolved by Mao in 1928, are designed

to "convince" the people that the Communist Army is different from the traditionally feared (and pitied) armed hordes of the past, and, at the same time, impart to the soldiers a feeling of professional pride.

Rules

The Three Disciplinary Rules are: obey orders under all circumstances; do not take a single needle or a piece of thread from the people; and hand in all booty to the government. The Eight Points of Attention follow: talk to the people politely; observe fair dealing in all business transactions; return everything borrowed; pay for anything damaged; have proper respect for women; do not beat or scold the people, damage crops, or ill-treat Prisoners of War. These rules were repromulgated in January 1947 when the civil conflict was beginning to assume nationwide proportions. Every year in the past decade, army personnel have been reminded of them in the yearly "support-the-government-love-the-people-and-support-the-army" campaigns which constitute the chief manifestation of the "close" relationship between army and civilians. Launched during the Chinese New Year's season, these campaigns combine political with social festivities.

During such a campaign, army officers and men are required to purge themselves of "warlordist" tendencies by self-criticism, while the civilians are persuaded to organize "troop-comforting" missions to local garrisons. At the end of the fraternizing, the army personnel pledge publicly their support of the government and love for the people, while the civilian participants express their support of the army as well as of the government.

The pervasive control system apparently has been effective in control-

ling the officers by checking the resurgence of the war-lord system, which has undermined political stability so often in modern China, and in compelling absolute obedience from the rank and file. For the officers, tendencies toward self-aggrandizement are discouraged by several factors.

First, the periodic ideological campaigns—regular nationwide or party-wide remolding campaigns as well as yearly armywide campaigns—expose the minutiae of deviationist thought. The fear and suspicion generated in the criticism and self-criticism, and the pressure brought to bear by friend and foe are sufficient to intimidate anyone with antiparty ideas and to elicit "confessions" from the accused of "crimes" they may never have committed, for the alternative is disgrace or even physical liquidation.

Second, the system of party committees and commissars, the latter claiming to be guardians of the welfare of the men, increases the distance between the military officers and the men, thereby limiting the paternalistic relationship that characterized the war-lord armies of the past.

Third, not only is the officer status impaired by the existence of a new elite (the political officers), but the identity of the officers as a distinct class is submerged by the fostering in the army of the idea of democracy. This was reemphasized recently by sending officers to serve in the ranks, some for as long as a year, to familiarize themselves with the mode of life of the common soldiers so as to improve officer-soldier relations. This tends to lower the prestige of the officers in the eyes of the soldiers, and further strengthens the notion that the commissars (and, therefore, the

party) alone are the protectors of their interests.

These controls over the officers make it unlikely that military leaders as such play an important role in politics in Communist China at the present time. The few former military officers like Chen Yi and Lin Piao who are now in decision-making positions cannot be said to be spokesmen for the

the possibility of conflict between the so-called traditionalist political officers who cling to their guerrilla past, and the younger generation of "professional" officers. This type of conflict, however, is not one of ideological significance, involving as it does only questions of military doctrine, and, therefore, should not be expected to develop into a crisis in leadership. In



Enlisted men say goodbye to a Chinese Communist Army general who has just completed 30 days' service as a private in the ranks

military. It is doubtful that they still retain the slightest control over their former armies. Therefore, it would be a mistake to expect the eruption of conflict between political and military elements in Communist China even though differences of opinion may sometimes be expressed by military leaders.


This, of course, does not rule out

the future, more officers will have been drawn from outside the party, and they may find it more difficult to reconcile professional excellence and political requirements. But by that time, these "professional" officers will have a vested interest in the society of which they are the beneficiaries. They will be too closely wedded to the system to question let alone challenge it.

Political Indoctrination

Even more important than the control of the officers is the effect of political control over the soldiers. The proverbial docility of the Chinese soldiers tends to make them particularly vulnerable to political indoctrination. Because the soldiers as a class have been held in low esteem in traditional Chinese society, they tend to feel flat-

this human element which, according to Chu Teh, remains the decisive factor in war. Nor should this human aspect be underestimated. United Nations personnel who saw action in Korea can testify that in the Chinese Communist Army orders were obeyed unquestionably, to the extent that soldiers often charged enemy positions not behind but under their own artil-



A Chinese Communist Army company is assembled for a critique of the ideological reasons for successes and failures in their training program

tered by the exaltation of their profession. Given some preferential treatment, however slight, they might ultimately identify themselves with the interests and ideals of the party and willingly make sacrifices for those interests and ideals. In their present stage of technological inferiority, the Chinese Communists apparently are placing new and added emphasis on

lery fire, regardless of losses in lives, so long as they would surprise the other side.

Military Doctrine

The continued effectiveness of the control over the men, however, depends on the availability of articulate and dedicated political commissars, particularly those on the company level, who must be conversant not only

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in party ideology but also in military doctrines. By itself this is a large enough order. As the army grows more complex with modernization, and as the revolutionary emotionalism recedes in the postrevolutionary period, indifferent, incompetent, or ignorant commissars eventually may reduce the entire system to a mere façade. Already there have been reports that some of the company political officers do not even know the number of men in their companies. At the present time, it is not known exactly how the political officers are trained, if at all. Whether they can stand the test of time remains to be seen.

It appears that the most basic weakness of the system is that the officers and men, in the process of indoctrination, are conditioned to accept a set of values, some of which may be false, lacking the spontaneous fanaticism of the Taiping or Cromwellian armies. The more intense and prolonged the indoctrination, the wider will become the gulf between myth and reality; and, therefore, when confronted with concrete evidence that what they have been led to believe has no basis in fact, they may be that much more

easily disillusioned. In the Korean War, for example, although the troops were supposedly well-indoctrinated, it was difficult for the Koreans to reconcile their own nationalism with Chinese Communist professions of internationalism. It was equally difficult for the Communist Chinese soldiers to behave like anything but conquerors, thus making the relationship between them and the Koreans anything but "brotherly." The fact that more than 14,000 Chinese prisoners refused to be repatriated is eloquent testimony to the corruptibility of the political control system.

Finally, political control adds a new dimension to war. Despite its weaknesses, it can spell the difference between victory and defeat in war. This is not to suggest that an army should be indoctrinated and controlled to the extent that Communist armies are. But given the low level of articulation among the military personnel in developing nations that are threatened by Communist insurgents, some efforts along these lines to counteract effectively Communist propaganda and political warfare would seem advisable.

... never has it been more important that the Congress and the American public support the efforts of free Asians to banish the curse of poverty, illness, and illiteracy. I know that, given something for which to fight, the peoples of Asia will man the ramparts of freedom with valor. But you know, as they do, that people do not fight in the steaming jungles to preserve hunger, squalor, and oppression.

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson

Guided Missiles in Antitank Defense

Major E. Varrone, *Swiss Army*

THE variations in terrain and the variety of conditions under which combat tanks are employed preclude the use of only one type of weapon in antitank defense. Technically, it is impossible to equip antitank defense units with an effective basic weapon of small size which is accurate at a distance of 10 meters as well as four kilometers.

Just as hand grenades, rifle grenades, mortars, and cannon complement each other in range characteristics, so must antitank weapons complement each other in tactical employment.

There are no clearly defined limits in combat. Only a good combination of different types of weapons permits the establishment of an effective antitank defense which will be able to respond to varying situations.

The antitank weapons currently available and their effective ranges are listed in Figure 1.

These new antitank weapons have passed the stage of factory and field tests. They have been recognized by military experts, although hesitantly by some. It has, in fact, taken 15 years for this new concept in weapons to be adopted by the various armies.

Antitank missiles may be employed at ranges as short as 200 meters depending on their characteristics. Thus there is a technical possibility that a single type of weapon would suffice for a range of 200 meters to four kilometers.

Figure 2 lists the guided missiles which are now known and the tech-

nical performance data which has been publicly released on each.

I. Use of Antitank Missiles

The armies of Western Europe and the United States have integrated antitank guided missiles into their forces at varying levels of command.

Federal Republic of Germany

The newly established armored infantry battalions have rocket platoons in their combat support companies. Each platoon consists of five tank details with 16 light guided missiles each, for a total of 80 guided missiles.

Within the armored brigades, antitank platoons equipped with heavy guided missiles are attached to the tank destroyer companies and tank battalions. Divisional tank destroyer companies also will have heavy antitank guided missile platoons.

France

The antitank defense platoon of the company is equipped with *Entac* or *SS-10* missiles. The platoon consists of a command detail, three firing details, and a supply detail. The antitank defense platoon has approximately 40 missiles at its disposal. Approximately 30 of these are carried in an ammunition truck.

French Army aviation has a number of aircraft and helicopters

This copyrighted article is translated from the original which appeared in ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITÄRZEITSCHRIFT (Switzerland) January 1961.

| <i>Weapon</i> | <i>Range</i> |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| Antitank grenade | 50 to 100 meters |
| Rocket tube | 150 to 300 meters |
| Recoilless rifle | Up to 1,000 meters |
| Tank gun, antitank gun | Up to 2 kilometers |
| Guided missiles | Up to 4 kilometers |

Figure 1.

IDENTIFICATION DATA OF ANTITANK DEFENSE GUIDED MISSILES

| Name | Producing Country | Range in Kilo-meters | Weight in Pounds | Diameter in Milli-meters | Penetrating Capability (Milli-meters of Steel) | Speed (Meters per Second) | Status |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|------------------|--------------------------|--|---------------------------|---------------|
| Light: | | | | | | | |
| <i>Bantam</i> | Sweden | 2 | 13.2 | 100 | Over 400 | 79 | Field tests |
| <i>Cobra 810</i> | Federal Republic of Germany | 1.8 | 22 | 100 | 550 | 85 | In production |
| <i>Entac</i> | France | 1.8 | 26.5 | 100 | Over 400 | 85 | In production |
| <i>SS-10</i> | France | 1.5 | 32.6 | 165 | Over 400 | 79 | In production |
| <i>Mosquito</i> | Switzerland | 1.8 | 25 | 120 | Over 500 | 89 | Field tests |
| <i>Shillelagh</i> | United States | 4 | 40 | 90 | Over 500 | 150 | Factory tests |
| <i>Vigilant 891</i> | Great Britain | 1.4 | 26.5 | 110 | 400 | 150 | Field tests |
| Heavy: | | | | | | | |
| <i>Malkara</i> | Australia | 3.2 | 200 | 150 | -- | 150 | In production |
| <i>Pye</i> | Great Britain | 4 | 80 | 150 | -- | 100 | Field tests |
| <i>SS-11</i> | France | 3 | 63 | 160 | Over 500 | 122 | In production |
| <i>SS-11B</i> | France | 3 to 4 | 63 | 160 | Over 600 | 122 | In production |
| <i>SS-12</i> | France | 6.5 | 150 | -- | Over 700 | Over 150 | Factory tests |

Published sources vary considerably on the characteristics of these weapons. This data is taken from several sources to include *Janes All The World's Aircraft*, 1960-61.

Figure 2.

equipped with antitank guided missiles. These include the *Potez 75*, *Fouga CM-170*, and *Dassault MD-311* aircraft. The *Alouette* and *H-13* helicopters can launch four to six guided missiles each.

The *AMX13* light tank has been equipped with four *SS-11* guided missiles in addition to a 75-mm cannon. These tanks proved successful in combat in the Sinai Campaign.

The armored tracklaying *Hotchkiss* vehicle *CC2* has been outfitted with guided missile launching devices. The vehicle weighs from six to eight tons and has two to four launchers which are installed above the armored crew compartment. A reserve of eight to 12 missiles can be stored in the crew compartment. The planned distribution for this self-propelled launcher has not been made public.

Great Britain

Production of the *Malkara* antitank guided missile has started. These guided missiles are slated primarily


for the "Royal Armored Corps." A new missile armed tank is being field tested. It is reported to be an armored tracklaying vehicle which fires the *Malkara* from a revolving launcher. The weight of the vehicle is said to be less than 25 tons.

Besides the heavy antitank guided missiles, the light *Vigilant* missile which is launched "by hand" or from reconnaissance tanks is being field tested.

United States

Within the battle group of the pentomic infantry division, the combat support companies originally were issued *M56* antitank vehicles with a 90-mm cannon instead of *M48* tanks. These were replaced with *SS-10* guided missiles last year. The battle group has a so-called missile platoon which consists of a command group and five squads.

The squad consists of five men, 25 light antitank guided missiles, *SS-10's* (later perhaps *SS-11's*), one jeep with



a triple launcher, and one $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton truck with trailer.*

The missile platoon numbers 29 men, 75 SS-10 guided missiles, seven jeeps, and five $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton trucks with trailers.

Similar to the development in France, United States Army aviation has helicopters outfitted with launchers. The following helicopters have been shown with antitank guided missiles: the H-13 with nine guided missiles, the HU-1A with six guided missiles, and the HOK with six guided missiles.

Tests are under way to equip the M59 tank with antitank guided missiles. The order to develop a combat tank serving also as an antitank missile carrier has been issued. At present, the vehicle is reported to be undergoing field tests.

Other Nations

The Bofors factory is working on the development of the light antitank

*The US has recently placed orders for the Entac missile to replace the SS-10 missile now in use.—Editor.

guided missile *Bantam*. As the development apparently is not as yet completed, the Swedish Army is introducing the SS-10 and SS-11 missiles. These guided missiles are designated for antitank defense platoons or companies. They are employed on jeeps equipped with three launchers each.


The Canadian Army has adopted the French SS-11.

After a number of field tests, the Norwegian Army has adopted the SS-10 antitank guided missile.

The Austrian Government has ordered a number of the *Mosquito* antitank rockets in order to conduct large-scale field tests.

II. Tactical Considerations

These missiles have been divided into two main groups according to range. As weight and range are closely related, one talks about "light" and "heavy" antitank guided missiles. "Light" antitank guided missiles are those weapons which can be brought into position and fired by infantry,



that is, by one or two men. Under the category "heavy" antitank guided missiles come those weapons which cannot be transported and brought into position by the servicing crew without technical resources, such as heavy motor vehicles, self-propelled chassis, or special combat tanks.

Those armies which already have antitank guided missiles in their units are pushing, with great energy and at considerable expense, the development of special missile carriers.

III. Weapons Characteristics

The characteristics which make these missiles especially suitable for antitank defense are: wide range and

Excluding guided missiles, the infantry, with weapons issued today, has three minutes or less to engage the tank. This shows the necessity for long-range infantry weapons which can engage enemy tanks at the greatest possible distance, if only to gain more time for the employment of other weapons.

Enemy Deployment

Another reason for utilizing long-range antitank weapons is that tanks distributed in depth furnish supporting fire for the leading tanks. Antitank guided missiles are especially well-suited for fighting these formations. Only an antitank defense which

| Type of defense | Range | Time |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Antitank grenade | 50 to 150 meters | 10 to 30 seconds |
| Rocket tube | 150 to 300 meters | 30 seconds to 1 minute |
| Recoilless rifle | 900 meters | 3 minutes |

Figure 3.

maneuverability, accuracy of fire and effect, acceptable cost, and flexibility of employment with other units.

A suitable antitank weapon must be capable of being employed over varying ranges. This becomes obvious when the period of time which antitank defenses have for firing is considered. This time span is determined by the distance between the enemy tank and the antitank weapon and the nature of the intervening terrain.

If the speed of an advancing tank is 18 kilometers per hour, it proceeds five meters in one second. The antitank defense theoretically has the time periods, as shown in Figure 3, from the time the tank comes within range to the overrunning of its position.

is capable of engaging these distant targets with weapons reserved for this purpose can hope for a successful defensive.

In the evaluation of the antitank defense problem it can be anticipated that the enemy will employ his tanks in mass. Therefore, as many tanks as possible must be knocked out during the short time available.

Success is only possible if the antitank defense units have at their disposal at least as many long-range weapons as the enemy has tanks in action.

Invulnerability

As guided missiles do not require heavy gun barrels or heavy launching racks, relatively light and mobile vehicle mounts can be employed. The

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Objective of weapon designers is to employ the antitank guided missiles from not too heavy but adequately armored combat vehicles.

This type of employment ensures the required mobility and provides protection for the crew while retaining the advantage of low weight, simplicity, and relatively small size.

With some missiles the launcher

capable of penetrating even 700 millimeters or more of steel plating. Today's 50-ton combat tanks are armored frontally with 90 to 140 millimeters of armor. Weapon shields and the turret may have a thickness of up to 200 millimeters.

Therefore, today's guided missiles can penetrate the armor plating with enough power to kill the crew, to



US HU-1 helicopter mounting six SS-11 missiles

US Army

and guidance device are set up separately. As the gunner is located away from the launcher, he escapes precision fire. This arrangement demands no greater qualifications from the gunner than those required of a good machinegunner, antiaircraftgunner, or cannoneer.

Penetration

The light antitank guided missiles with their hollow cone charges can penetrate steel plates 350 to 600-mm thick. The heavy guided missiles are

ignite the ammunition and gasoline, or to destroy vital parts.

Simplicity

The equipment for launching and guiding missiles is not as intricate as, for instance, the stabilizer of a modern combat tank gun. Both the "light" and "heavy" missiles are ready for action within a few minutes and require no more servicing than a radio transmitter.

The small size of the launchers and

guidance devices permit effective camouflage and even without camouflage present only a small target. New types of propellant leave no trace visible at a distance, thus the launching position is not disclosed.

Costs

In determining cost, it is very difficult to compare weapons of various types. The number of rounds required to knock a tank out of operation or to destroy it must be taken into consideration as well as the actual cost of each round.

Such a calculation is practically impossible without war experience. Certainly, it is not feasible to compare only the bare cost of ammunition without considering the expense involved in bringing this ammunition into action. At any rate the cost of a training hour for a missilegunner is no higher than that for a tankgunner or cannoneer.

These factors add up to the conclusion that antitank guided missiles provide a means by which infantry antitank defense can be considerably improved.

You are familiar with the old military axiom that an army must be able to move, shoot, and communicate. Wars of this century have put added emphasis on a fourth requirement—the ability to survive. Armored vehicles are uniquely qualified to meet all four requirements, particularly in Europe where their capabilities for rapid movement can be fully exploited. With this mechanization, the modern fighting man will obtain the adaptability and flexibility essential to true combat effectiveness.

It is therefore our goal, by increasing the supply of the newest and most modern equipment, to make Seventh Army a truly armored army, with all of the elements of its combat arms enjoying the protection of armor and the mobility of mechanization.

Complementing our ground mobility is the development of new concepts and equipment for Army aviation, which is bringing about a revolution in the Army's ability to surmount the obstacles of time and terrain in the movement of troops, weapons, and supplies, and to ensure continuously effective control over its deployed units. Furthermore, the contributions of Army aviation to effective combat surveillance are helping immeasurably to extend the eyes and ears of the commander—to provide him with detailed battlefield information of unprecedented scope, accuracy, and timeliness, which vastly increases his ability to make prompt and valid command decisions.

Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.

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Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben



IN 1910 the American Congress erected a monument in front of the White House in Washington, a monument for Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, general in the American War of Independence, a Prussian officer in the service of American freedom.

The life and works of Von Steuben, the erstwhile aide-de-camp of Frederick the Great and later inspector general of the American Army in the War of Independence, tie, in a peculiar manner, the military heritage of old Prussian tradition with the genesis and principles of the first political democracy of modern times.

The journey of Baron von Steuben's life seems like music, composed by fate and influenced by incidents and the contingencies of the times. As such, it has a special significance for a new era.

The young Captain von Steuben, born in Magdeburg, served in the

Seven Years' War as aide-de-camp with the staff of Frederick the Great. After the close of this war the *Alte Fritz* (Old Frederick) set up a special class at Prussia's War College. There Frederick himself taught the art of war to his future staff. Among the 13 students was young Captain von Steuben.

However, demobilization soon became the order of the day. The former soldiers and the money to support them were needed for the reconstruction of the land which had been thoroughly exhausted by the war. Thus, one day, Von Steuben found himself transferred to the remote garrison of Wesel.

This anonymous, copyrighted article is translated from the original which appeared in SOLDAT UND TECHNIK (Federal Republic of Germany), March 1961.

Von Steuben, an unruly hotspur, believed the transfer to the "backward place" to be the result of an intrigue by Count Anhalt, Frederick's adjutant. He had never been on good terms with Anhalt and, without hesitation, challenged him to a duel. When the *Alte Fritz* learned of this, he discharged the young hothead on the spot and even ordered him to leave the country.

Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, who had been a friend of Von Steuben's for years, employed him as grand marshal at his court. He served in this capacity until 1776, the year in which the newly constituted Continental Congress proclaimed the independence and union of the 13 states. At this time the prince was in financial embarrassment. His grand marshal, by then 46 years old, deemed it proper to look for some other occupation, if possible, in the soldier's profession.

Through his old friend Brigadier Hahn in Strasbourg he offered his services to Count de Saint-Germain, War Minister of His Majesty King Ludwig XVI of France. At the time, Saint-Germain was advocating a reform of the French Army and Von Steuben thought he might be useful. European armies had no "principle of nationality," as such, at that time.

Count de Saint-Germain knew Von Steuben. He had served for a time under Frederick in the division of the prince of Württemberg. Saint-Germain had great respect for Von Steuben and valued his military talents highly. However, he was afraid to increase the strong opposition against his reform plans for Ludwig's army by employing a self-willed "Prussian staff officer" in addition to the other numerous German officers. No action

was taken on Von Steuben's application even though Brigadier Hahn had supported it.

An Appeal From America

Then in the spring of 1777 something happened. Benjamin Franklin, the 70-year-old representative of the recently established Congress of the 13-state union, arrived in Paris. He asked for experts capable of reorganizing the American troops as there was concern for the development of the War of Independence. France already had shipped over thousands of muskets and cannons on camouflaged frigates, but that did not compensate for the poor organization of the territorial army. The fighters for independence had fought the English mercenary troops bravely, but there was danger that in the long run they would be defeated by the superior tactics, weapons, and organization of the enemy. British troops had forced them deeper and deeper into the interior of the land, and they were losing their harbors. This presented a danger of being cut off from French aid.

Franklin was received enthusiastically in Paris. However, Count de Saint-Germain and Count de Vergennes, Minister of Foreign Affairs, feared that a war with England might ensue if a general of the royal army were to be assigned to the Americans as advisor. In this situation, Saint-Germain dispatched a messenger for Baron von Steuben and had him come from Karlsruhe to Paris. A representative of Franklin already had cautiously approached Von Steuben after Lee, Franklin's mediator in Berlin, had made no headway in gaining support from Frederick. The Prussian King did not want to endanger his good relations with England because they were important to him.

Franklin and Von Steuben


Von Steuben arrived in Paris by fast coach. There, by order of Saint-Germain, Caron de Beaumarchais (author of *Figaro*) took him under his wing and explained what Dr. Franklin wanted. During a conference, Franklin told Von Steuben that he was extremely interested in him but that he was not empowered to make a contract in regard to pay and rank as this decision would be made by the Congress. Von Steuben assured him that he was willing to offer his services to George Washington's army as a volunteer, but when Franklin disclosed that he could not guarantee travel expense either and offered, in lieu of money, a grant of forest land in the wilderness as compensation for the expense, Von Steuben flew into a rage. Without delay and with bitter feelings he returned to Karlsruhe.

Beaumarchais intervened upon Saint-Germain's request. The French offered to secure support for an early crossing and a satisfactory settlement. Von Steuben accepted and returned to Paris. The Paris firm "Hortalez and Company" outfitted him and financed the voyage. Hortalez and Company was the front for the weapon deliveries to North America. The real name of the owner "Rodrique Hortalez" was Beaumarchais and his "company" was the French Government.

Fire, Storm, and Mutiny

On 26 September 1777 the war frigate, *L'Heureux*, masqueraded as a merchant ship under the assumed name of *Flammand*, sailed from Marseilles to the New World. On board were 1,700 barrels of gunpowder, a "Monsieur Frank," alias Von Steuben, and his party. This voyage was full of

dramatic incidents—storm, damage by sea, fire, and mutiny. Monsieur Frank ably mastered these incidents proving his courage and energy. The ship finally entered Plymouth, the port of destination, on 1 December. Here the "Von Steuben" chapter in the history



US Army

Inscription on base of Von Steuben statue in Washington, D. C.

of the American War of Independence begins.

Valley Forge and Fortitude

On 23 February 1778 the Prussian baron and his party finally arrived on horseback at Valley Forge, George Washington's winter camp. There he saw an army of several thousand, half-starved, wretched men in rags. The grave and reserved Washington showed them to him with no attempt to gloss over the desolate conditions. After a few days Von Steuben confessed to the American commander

in chief with admiration, "I cannot envision one single army in all Europe which would hold together under these circumstances."

The Prussian was irresistibly fascinated by the fortitude of the men. The need for materiel and organization obviously was caused, in part, by the lack of experience in modern military science and, in part, by unpreparedness. Last, but not least, it was the result of the improvisations of a young political organism put to a hard test to prove its very existence.

Often the strength of regiments existed only on paper because men whose one-year term of enlistment ran out simply went home. The procurement of new men depended on chance recruiting in the individual states. It was common practice for the ones who left to take along their issued weapons. Thus 6,000 muskets alone had disappeared. There were no supply arsenals.

Discipline and Drill

The militia soldiers had no idea of drill training and unit tactics. They knew only the bush fighting which they had used against the Indians. There were no drill regulations nor any other form of troop discipline which was a matter of course in all European armies. They marched "Indian fashion," one behind another, or any way they chose. When contact was made with the trained columns of Scotch Highlander units or the "leased" Hessians, it was impossible to concentrate firepower quickly.

The march columns of the Americans were four times the length of enemy march columns of equal strength; consequently, it took them four times as long to form a battle-line. Wheeling, the "about-face," con-

centration of fire during attack, or the control of a withdrawal from the enemy were unknown. There was no orderly logistics. Reserves of supplies or weapons did not exist. But there was unparalleled fighting morale in this army of individual fighters and rangers. In spite of this Von Steuben was able to solve the nearly impossible problems during the short time he had at his disposal.

Two Gold Dollars and Morale

Von Steuben's introduction to the troops was memorable. He immediately organized a model company composed of men who had previously served in European armies. He himself trained them in the new skills, serving as both corporal and chief. All in the camp who still had breeches and shoes watched with intense interest. But there were a lot of poor devils who did not even have breeches and had to cover that part of their bodies with blankets.

Von Steuben estimated the number of "pantsless" at, roughly, 300. One evening he invited them to his quarters for a meal. For the occasion he had bought and prepared two oxen with two gold dollars he had brought with him. It was stipulated that only men without breeches would be admitted to the free meal. When the time arrived, half of the army of Valley Forge seemed to have a pantsless rendezvous at Von Steuben's quarters, much to his consternation and the delight of everyone else. However, the two roasted oxen were not enough for all these men and Von Steuben's paymaster, and his mess master, were greatly troubled. This amused Von Steuben. From this evening on, the Prussian with his queer innovations became the soldiers' "Father-in-the-Army."

Parades and Reviews

Credit for the success and effect of Von Steuben's action is due to the enthusiastic and willing cooperation on the part of the soldiers, and to the unswerving support which Washington rendered. The energetic and comradely cooperation of his adjutant Hamilton and General Greene, a dare-



US Army

Major General (Baron) von Steuben

devil who was highly respected, also contributed.

Von Steuben, with Greene's and Hamilton's assistance, wrote uniform drill regulations adapting Frederick's ideas to the needs of his army. Von Steuben wrote regulation after regulation, dictating them in French to his adjutant Du Ponceau who, in turn, translated them into English. Greene and Hamilton then edited them into English military language. Handwritten copies of all sections were made for the regiments, battalions, and companies. Concurrently, Von Steuben trained the model company, the future instructors of the army. On 19

March this model company assembled for the first time for a parade in front of the whole camp, accompanied by a bugler who blew the reveille bugle call of the Potsdam Guards.

Barely two months later, on 6 May, the whole army assembled for the first grand review using Von Steuben's regulations. The occasion was the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with the King of France. The day was the birthday of a new army. In honor of the day, extra rations were issued and each man received a gill of rum. George Washington informed the "volunteer" Von Steuben that Congress had appointed him inspector general "with the rank and pay of a major general, his pay to commence from the time he joined the army and entered into the service of the United States."

Jealousy and Deception

However, among Washington's officers were quite a few who resented the "Prussian" drillmaster. They did not fancy the new methods. One of them was General Charles Lee who recently had been released from British captivity through an exchange of prisoners. Lee had served in the British Army and in the Russian Army. His war experience had won him a good reputation in the American headquarters, in Congress, and among the troops.

In early summer when operations were to start again, Washington, having confidence in Von Steuben's reforms, planned offensive warfare. General Lee opposed the plan. In his opinion the American troops were militia units which could not stand up to the "regulars" of the enemy and should only engage in a wearing-down strategy. He even insinuated that Von Steuben might like to become supreme commander of the army.

Lee's objections had a hampering effect upon Washington's summer campaign. The relations between Lee and Von Steuben became so tense that Von Steuben challenged him to a duel, but Lee avoided the meeting. Later, it was claimed that Lee had collaborated with Clinton, British commander, to overwhelm Washington's "rebel army." Washington was to be lured into the Chesapeake Bay area where his army was to be destroyed.

Administration and Logistics

When the summer campaign of 1778 brought no military decision and the time for operations had passed, Von Steuben began to organize a functional administration to assure a regulated flow of supplies, armament, and equipment, which provided for a form of property accounting. He became Washington's personal representative in Congress and, in spite of numerous difficulties, finally achieved his objectives—the establishment of hospitals, supply depots, and workshops.

He also succeeded in having the "Regulations of the Army," the so-called "Blue Book," printed. His adjutant North later said that next to the Bible it was held in the highest esteem in the freedom army. For reasons of economy, Congress had commissioned a single bookbinder to bind the several thousand copies. This was characteristic of the calamities and growing financial worries with which Washington and his assistants were faced.

The steady depreciation of the currency raised doubts about the success of their efforts. At the end of 1778 the paper dollar was worth only one-eighth of its nominal value. Provisions and equipment which officers had to procure for themselves had to be

obtained almost exclusively from the black market. The appropriations of Congress for the inspector general trickled in and were of little value when they finally arrived. Von Steuben had to finance his official trips, and he had no private property or other resources in this country to fall back on. The usurious rates of interest at which money had to be borrowed and the cost of necessities grew into unimaginable proportions. This did not discourage Von Steuben from carrying out his mission, but the condition of the troops inevitably was affected.

The Winter in Virginia

When Von Steuben arrived at the onset of winter in Virginia to line up new troops for Greene's south army he found the Virginia soldiers in a deplorable condition. They were hungry and suffering from disease, scabies, and frostbite. The treasury of the state capital in Richmond had no money. The house of representatives decided to authorize a new tax payable in tobacco or hemp instead of the worthless paper dollars.

Soldiers who enlisted for the duration of the war were to receive the equivalent of 60 pounds in gold or silver and 300 acres of land at the end of the war. However, this did not improve their present situation. Von Steuben demanded new levies from Governor Jefferson and, if necessary, the requisition of supplies, horses, and wagons for the reorganization of an effective force in an area which was threatened by the enemy army.

Jefferson dared not make a decision without the approval of the Congress. The latter was not in favor of Von Steuben's demands. After prolonged discussions Jefferson finally issued limited requisition orders, which

should have produced the horses that were needed so desperately. Breeding horses were excluded from the draft, which is understandable. But when the quartermaster finally was permitted to search for mounts, almost all the stock in Virginia was breeding stock. When the English attacked, Von Steuben had nothing but the poorly armed militia of Jefferson to throw against them. The planned American cavalry did not exist, and the English took all the thoroughbred horses they liked. Their thus revived cavalry thrust forward rapidly to seize the laboriously established supply depots of the Virginians.

Yorktown and Demobilization

Finally, in the autumn of 1781 Washington's army, together with a French expeditionary corps, succeeded in encircling the British General Cornwallis with 7,000 men at Yorktown. There Von Steuben advantageously used his experience in siege tactics gained in the Seven Years' War. He directed the organization of the artillery, outlined the positions, and planned the attack. As commander of a division, he accepted the surrender of the enemy. Yorktown practically decided the war. One year later the Peace of Paris was concluded.

Assisted by his "chief of planning" Washington demobilized the army. The public purse of the state was completely empty. Instead of the overdue pay and the promised bonus, Congress issued only certificates for their arrears in pay to the discharged soldiers. These certificates were to be redeemed sometime in the future. Speculators and greedy moneylenders bought them from the penniless and destitute men for peanuts.

The wounded and disabled soldiers suffered the most; they did not know

where to turn. Von Steuben tirelessly undertook to establish hospitals and nursing homes. He converted the West Point army camp into a large station for all veterans of the War of Independence who were sick or in distress. When the two New York regiments were deactivated, the officers wrote cordial farewell letters to Von Steuben calling him gratefully "Father of Soldiers."

Honors and Accusations

Washington's last official act before he retired as commander in chief was to write a most affectionate letter of appreciation to General von Steuben. He acknowledged the sincere friendship which bound the two men. In March of the following year the Inspector General von Steuben was honorably discharged from the army and Congress gave him a Sword of Honor.

Meanwhile, Beaumarchais of France sent Von Steuben an invoice for the cost, plus interest, of his voyage to America. Congressional settlement of the compensation due Von Steuben did not make much progress in spite of Washington's and Jefferson's intercessions. Former officers had founded the "Society of the Cincinnati" of which Washington was president. Von Steuben was looked upon as the creator of the society and its enemies directed their attacks against him in Congress. They intimated that the "Prussian" was going to organize a "new caste and a nobility order of officers." There was a series of unpleasant incidents in Congress because of the compensation for Von Steuben until the city fathers of New York made General von Steuben an honorary citizen of their city. Finally, in 1785 Congress approved a resolution awarding the pay in arrears.

Retirement and Recall

Baron von Steuben sold part of the grant of virgin forests in the Mohawk district, which Virginia had given him for his efforts on behalf of the defense of the state, and retreated to his books and studies in a log cabin on the remaining part of his property. The cordial friendship with his former fellow soldiers and war comrades remained steadfast.

In the spring of 1794, one decade after the end of the Revolutionary War, it appeared that war with England was again imminent. Washington, now President, called his former general and asked him to work out a defense plan for the harbor of New York and the open Union borders, north and west of the capital. Congress appointed Von Steuben president of the newly organized defense commission.

At the end of the summer the old rider, with a handful of companions, made an inspection tour on horseback riding hundreds of miles to the western border district at Onondaga Lake to plan security measures against a

well-equipped garrison at Fort Oswego. On this occasion the general very narrowly escaped becoming a victim of the Black Foot Indians who were out to earn a reward for the head of the "big white chief" which had been slyly offered by the English.

Final Recognition

The old swashbuckler cunningly slipped away and, riding daringly, he reached his farm safe and sound. But it seems that the effort had been too hard on him for he died, suddenly and unexpectedly, a few weeks later at his forest farm near Oneida Lake at the age of 64. His former adjutant North buried him as he had desired wrapped in his old cloak under a tree without a marker. In his will he left all his possessions to his former adjutants, Bill North and Ben Walker.

Later, Walker had the mortal remains of his great friend moved into the forest and placed under a large granite boulder. He donated the last resting place of General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben to the United States. Today this national park is called "Steuben Park."

Courage is probably the most fundamental attribute of a commander. It must be the kind of courage that endures despite stress and dangers and reverses. Obviously, the commander must have *physical* courage, for he must set the example. But for the commander more than other men—and the higher the commander, the more pronounced this is—there is a special requirement for *moral* and *spiritual* courage. This is the courage which enables the commander to do what he knows is right, regardless of the consequences to himself. This is the courage to accept criticism and blame in silence when it is for the best interest of the organization or the Nation. Without such courage, there can be no initiative, and any amount of knowledge and imagination will be sterile—for they will produce nothing.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer

Peking's Influence in Africa

Fritz Schatten

AFTER a decade determined largely by the necessity of consolidating power at home, by military and subversive ventures in immediately adjoining areas, and by tentative soundings in Asia at large, Mao Tse-tung's regime has, in the past two years, embarked upon massive diplomatic offensives and infiltration efforts in underdeveloped countries. The declared principal target of this "leap forward" is Africa.

This continent, which only now, and with all possible symptoms of restlessness, is emerging from the dark of political amorphousness, in fact, offers a wealth of openings to the Messianic and world-political ambitions of Peking. Colonialism and paternalism are making a precipitate retreat before a nationalism based on emotions and largely without clear-cut aims.

The young African elite lacks experience as much as nearby models to follow. It is opposed equally to African traditionalism and European liberalism. For only a few of its members has the encounter with orthodox Marxism been a painful deception; in the eyes of the radicals, moreover, it is these few who search for conciliation with the colonial regimes.

In this situation communism exerts considerable attraction. It is seen as having achieved the social and economic development of backward countries against their own "reactionaries" and without foreign aid. That this development has cost a gigantic sacrifice and the lives of many is not even known to most Africans. Com-

munist propaganda tells them that only those who opposed the march of the "law of history" had to die.

Not always has Communist propaganda been able to make this assertion plausible. The Kremlin's version of the Hungarian tragedy of 1956, for example, is hardly accepted. Quite different is the reaction to the Chinese aggression in Tibet. In this case, a Westerner will be told with much emphasis, Peking was absolutely right: its action was part of the struggle against the same feudal forces which also sought to stem progress in Africa.

Such arguments reveal the many points of departure which Peking either has established for itself in Africa, or which it has found already present there, to be exploited. In this respect China has a great advantage over the Soviet Union. In Africa, Moscow's strength is at the same time its weakness. The Soviets' boasting to Africans about their *Luniks*, *Sputniks*, rockets, and industrial achievements places them, in the eyes of many Africans, on the same level with the Western industrial countries.

In other words, the Soviet Union has already achieved a stage of economic development which is way out of reach for the underdeveloped countries. It offers them no attainable example to follow. An African visitor to Moscow

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may be greatly impressed by the colossal buildings, the subways, and the giant industrial plants—on second thought he will become aware of the infinite distance that separates his country from the USSR.

Africa's "Natural Ally"

An African's experience with China is different. Despite the great care taken by the Chinese in choosing the exhibits to be shown foreign tourists, no member of the numerous delegations that have visited Mao's empire can have failed to notice the evidence of things unfinished and rudimentary. In 1959 alone more than 800 foreign groups, at least 270 of them from African countries, traveled to Peking. The poverty of the Chinese population is as obvious as the primitiveness of many of its working procedures. And as reports of African visitors to Peking reveal, no effort is made by the Chinese guides to conceal these facts.

On the contrary, they use them to impress their visitors with the many alleged similarities between China's economic condition in 1950 and that of large parts of Africa today. A European may smile at the Chinese one-man furnaces; the Africans are encouraged by them. Fully automatic blast furnaces, sinter installations, remote-controlled rolling mills, and all the other intricate industrial equipment cannot be designed, constructed, and operated by the Africans themselves for some time to come. The Chinese miniature furnaces, on the other hand, can be managed even by unskilled Guineans or Congolese.

In addition, Mao's people go to great lengths to generate the feeling among the Africans that they are "brother races," in distinction from the Russians. In their efforts to win favor, the Soviets push representatives of

their Asian minorities to the foreground; nevertheless, the Soviet regime, as such, remains "European" in African eyes.

Diplomatic Penetration

On the diplomatic level, Peking has found, and continues to find, a unique situation in Africa. When the new African states started to come into being, Red China had already existed for all of eight years. Only one African country—Liberia—maintained diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek. For the states just emerged from colonial tutelage, the choice between the island state on Taiwan and the huge mainland empire was, of course, not difficult to make. Following Ethiopia and the United Arab Republic, Morocco, Sudan, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo have yielded to Peking's pressure for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Many others soon may accept the invitations already extended to them.

Those who view Chinese communism as the guardian of the grail of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy have to learn differently in Africa. Here Peking's emissaries conduct themselves, whenever it is politic, as quite undogmatic. They seem to consider it most important to make their African partners forget, at least at the beginning, that they are dealing with radical Communists.

This tactical flexibility has borne rich fruit. In Morocco, for example, after the proscription of the Communist Party in September 1959, the Chinese Embassy in Rabat immediately cut off relations with members of the party. Neither the African broadcasts of Radio Peking nor the Chinese publications distributed in the Maghreb contain any criticism whatsoever of the Moroccan Government's measures.

Instead, the *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* is now being courted. Mehdi Ben Barka, the leader of this organization, formerly president of the consultative assembly of Morocco, after a trip to China expressed sincere sympathy for the People's Republic.

Rabat and Peking

The government of Rabat repeatedly has emphasized the value of friendly relations with Peking, as based primarily on increased trade. In 1959 Moroccan imports from Communist China amounted to a value of 26.8 million Swiss francs, and Moroccan exports to China to a value of 22 million Swiss francs. In 1960 the total of this trade reached 45.5 million francs (10.6 million dollars) for both countries. Accordingly, China has moved to fifth place among Morocco's trade partners. This increased importance also became evident at the Casablanca Fair in June 1960. Out of 21 exhibitors, Peking had the largest pavilion. Posters and pamphlets showed the African visitors to the fair how "comprehensively" Peking so far has helped the Asian underdeveloped countries and how favorable is the outlook for Africa if she maintains good relations with Communist China.

Simultaneously with this promotion of trade, another effort has been intensified in Morocco. In Casablanca, Rabat, and Meknes the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese political leaders are being offered for sale; books and periodicals are given away to students.

A similar symbiosis of trade and political propaganda can be observed in other parts of Africa. Since 1957 Peking has never tired of demonstrating its interest in cotton from Uganda, and in July 1959 an agreement was

concluded for the purchase by the Chinese of 25,000 bales of cotton valued at half a million pound sterling. Together with the trade experts, party propagandists turned up in Kampala, inaugurating a large exchange of visits with radical native leaders.

Uganda

The most prominent Uganda guest in Peking last fall was Joseph Kiwanuka, President of the "African National Congress." He received the sum of 40,000 pound sterling to finance the *Uganda Post*, a newspaper dedicated to the cause of extreme nationalism. "I do not believe," Kiwanuka declared after his return from the People's Republic, "that communism is a bad thing." And although he rejected the Communist recipe for Uganda, it is evident that such a statement is a large gain for Mao's regime.

Similar statements can be heard from dozens of African pilgrims to China, whether they come from the Congo, the Ivory Coast, or other parts of the continent. The lavish and emphatically cordial reception given even to lower-ranking guests rarely fails to make the intended impression.

Guinea and Cameroon

A more advanced stage of Chinese Communist penetration has been reached in Guinea. As a result of the conclusion in October 1959 of an agreement on technical aid, the dispatch of a Peking chargé d'affaires and numerous "consultative" groups, and the arrival of the first Communist Chinese Ambassador in Conakry, Mao Tse-tung's men have gained direct influence on Guinea's politics. This influence especially is evident in the program for the future development of its agriculture which, according to a three-year plan, is to be collectivized to a large extent. According

to talks during the second conference on Afro-Asian solidarity, Guinea is to "make use of the experiences of the great agrarian revolution of the Chinese People's Republic." A fairly large group of Chinese agrarian "experts" is already at work in the country.

Persistent rumors have it that China will send "several hundred" rice farmers to Guinea to reorganize and intensify rice farming in the West African republic. From assorted evidence, one gets the impression that the political leaders in Conakry are inclined to favor the Chinese more and more, while relations with those Eastern bloc countries which in the past have been most active in Guinea—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany—have moved to the background.

Africa—A Propaganda Target

Peking unequivocally manifests the overriding motive and ultimate aim of its African policy. Ideological infiltration and the creation of a common Sino-African ideological basis is to lead to revolution and communication on the continent.

This tendency also is expressed clearly in Peking's general Africa propaganda. Since the expansion of the far-reaching shortwave broadcasts of Radio Peking—including the establishment of 24 modern stations for foreign service—10 one-hour programs are being beamed at Africa daily. By comparison, Moscow at present has "only" 31 hours of broadcasts a week to Africa. Three groups of topics are being stressed:

China as an example—The methods of the "liberation" of China from the "semicolonialism" of Chiang Kai-shek are, like the development of industry, society, and culture within Mao's empire since 1949, described as an

example for the Africans to imitate.

Decolonization—The "liberation" of Africa from Western domination is urged to proceed more quickly and more thoroughly; the most important thing is said to be the liquidation of all Western investments and the rejection of all Western offers of aid, which are considered as mere "neocolonialist" attempts to gain influence. A favorite topic is United States imperialism, described as the "main wire puller" of all colonialist ventures in Africa. Only recently Peking has begun a series of broadcasts on the "criminal intentions" of the "so-called American aid to underdeveloped countries."

Chinese "identification"—Peking identifies itself immediately and completely with every form of African emancipation. Thus Hu Yu-Chih, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, declared at a reception for Congolese politicians, according to Radio Peking:

The Chinese people who won their victory through a long struggle against imperialism and colonialism consider the fight of the Congolese people as their own fight and the victory of the Congolese people as their own victory.

Recurring Themes

In Peking's propaganda writings for Africa and in its manifestations within China on behalf of Africa—Kenya Day, Uganda Day, Help Algeria Week, Day of Solidarity with Cameroon, and so forth—these three themes recur regularly. Unmistakably all the Chinese propaganda on and to Africa has the intention of describing Mao's empire as the "natural" ally of the awakening continent. By its "special experience" in the anticolonial fight for "liberation" in economic

development and social change, it claims the right to more than a mere partner's role; to the leadership of the revolutionary forces, and to the protection of Africa against all "imperialist intervention." Peking's effort to play the role of Africa's protector is finding approval on the part of the Africans. It points to a very threatening aspect of the future development of the continent.

Despite the large volume of the ac-

tivity of Communist China in Africa, this has been only the overture to Peking's effort to gain power and supremacy on the continent. For many years a large part of China's African policy has been conducted by the Peking affiliate of the Afro-Asian solidarity organization. But recently, a special "Society for Sino-African Friendship" has been founded, whose task it is to give the effort of infiltration new impulses and coordination.

The Communists are determined to capture the minds of the peoples of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This is the ideological 'no-man's land' we must influence.

Emerging young states are carefully cultivated. . . . The Communist bloc is presented as a staunch supporter of these formerly oppressed colonial peoples who are striving to achieve independence, or struggling to make their new independence work. These peoples are offered assistance to plan a so-called 'socialist' economy. This offer, together with that of economic aid and suggestions for association with the 'free socialist camp,' is sometimes difficult to resist. Quite understandably—young countries, like young people, wish to get ahead in a hurry.

These undecided nations cannot be permitted to pass, by default or inaction on our part, into the Communist camp. . . . We must persuade and convince these tens of millions of people that a system of government based on spiritual truth and moral values is preferable to one in which the rights and welfare of the individual are subordinated to the interests of the state.

General Clyde D. Eddleman

United States Army War College

*P*rudens Futuri—Provident for the Future—expresses, in motto form, the spirit and purpose of the United States Army War College. Secretary of War Elihu Root founded the college in 1901 in response to a recognized need for intensive study of the diversified problems inherent in the preparation for and the conduct of war.

The original mission combined the preparation of selected officers for duties at the highest levels of the Army with concurrent planning and operational activities for the War Department. Thus members of the college worked on current problems confronting the War Department, not entirely in the theoretical manner of "students," but as general staff officers in the broadest sense.

Gradually the concentration on purely military subjects shifted. The National Defense Act of 1916 specifically prohibited the detail of officers on general staff duty as instructors or students at the War College thereby accelerating a change to a curriculum that focused more upon theory, abstract problems, and doctrine. Five years later the college began to function as an integral part of the Army School System. Since that time, progressive evolution has characterized the expansion of the college's mission which today includes the broad scope of problems encompassed in the term "national security."

The current, fourfold mission of the United States Army War College is:

- Prepare selected officers for the highest command and staff positions in their service and in joint and allied

commands, and for such high level positions within the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies as their services may be called upon to fill.

- Develop tactical and logistical doctrine for the organization, employment, and operations of large army echelons (army group and theater army), including joint aspects, and provide curriculum coverage at these levels.

- Develop studies relating to optimum strategies, doctrine, organization, and equipment for current and future Army forces.

- Develop interservice and interdepartmental understanding.

The mission, oriented toward the future, transcends the interests of any one military service or department of government. It emphasizes broad education encompassing far more than the military, as opposed to training for a narrow specific purpose. Recognizing that strategy can no longer be expressed solely in terms of military power, the mission dictates full consideration of the numerous and varied factors which influence the attainment of national objectives.

The curriculum provides three general areas of study:

1. National Power and International Relations.

2. Military Power and National Security Policy.

3. A US National Strategy and Its Supporting Military Program.

The initial study area—*National Power and International Relations*—furnishes the background material es-

sential for subsequent courses. A survey of the national domestic environments of the United States and USSR in historical perspective and a study of the forces and trends over the next 15 years are the bases of an assessment of the comparative power positions of the United States and the USSR, now, and in the future. This is followed by an examination of se-

Power and National Security Policy—introduces the military portion of the curriculum with stress on the development of interservice understanding and the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior commanders worldwide. First, an examination of current strategic concepts and strategic forces available to the United States prepares students to



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Eminent Americans join War College committees during the National Strategy Seminar

lected regional areas of the world, an evaluation of United States foreign policy with respect to those areas, and an appreciation of forces and trends, projected 10 to 15 years into the future. A highlight of this portion of the curriculum is the United Nations trip where class members observe the functioning of this important international organization.

The next study area—*Military*

look at the world situation from the point of view of unified commanders. Committees then form into functional staffs and develop strategic capabilities plans for the world's major areas—Europe, Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East—in the current timeframe and from the viewpoints of opposing commanders—Red and Blue. War games test these plans. A "think" exercise follows strategic

planning wherein committees design Army forces patterned to fulfill the land warfare requirements visualized for 15 years hence. Then, efforts are directed toward the Continental United States in the midrange period. This study includes the defense of North America, governmental organization for national security, mobilization readiness, the production base,

Military Program—actually represents the underlying theme of the entire curriculum. It integrates all of the preceding knowledge gained into a program aimed at assuring the accomplishment of national objectives. The study culminates with a National Strategy Seminar with some 100 eminent Americans from numerous professional fields joining committees to



Bliss Hall where students work on their theses

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economic capability for war, training base and Reserves, defense budget structure, and our Nation's ability to cope with all types of war. A field trip to various military installations highlights this part of the course and permits students to witness, at first hand, several categories of operational military forces.

The final area of study—*US National Strategy and Its Supporting*

assist in refining student-developed national strategies, implementing courses of action, and supporting military programs. In a sense, the National Strategy Seminar serves as a test of the students and faculty and the curriculum itself.

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utes immeasurably to the success of the curriculum and also permits the employment of student committees as the primary instructional vehicle. A typical United States Army War College Class consists of 200 students—162 Army; 10 Navy; six Marine Corps; 16 Air Force; and six from civilian governmental agencies. The average age is 42 years, and the average length of commissioned service is 18 years. All arms and services are represented. Collectively, such a group contains a wealth of talent and experience derived from practically every corner of the globe. Student committees work in an environment of intellectual freedom using their own reservoir of experience, research and study, and logical reasoning to derive sound solutions for the numerous challenging problems presented.

In addition to participating as committee members during the entire 10-month curriculum, students also concentrate upon individual study. Each student, as an integral part of the courses of study, prepares and presents a thesis on a subject of importance and of value to the US Army, Department of Defense, or national security. By individual creative thinking—based upon rigorous research, evaluation, close reasoning, and analysis—the student's effort not only increases his learning but also contributes to existing knowledge in a field of interest to the military profession.

Approximately 180 members of the 1960-61 College Class, on a purely voluntary and off-duty-time basis, enrolled for graduate study to attain credits toward a Master of Arts Degree in International Affairs. In recognition of the War College's curriculum—which has been evaluated as equivalent to 36 semester hours of

graduate study—participants in this George Washington University Program receive credit for one-half of the normal hours necessary for the degree. Students may complete the remaining hours by matriculating in the University Program that has been designed specifically to augment the College Curriculum.

The faculty, headed by the Commandant, Major General Thomas W. Dunn, United States Army, is composed of selected officers who, as a group, are capable of providing professional advice in practically every military field. The vast majority of the approximately 50 members—which includes representatives from Department of State, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—are graduates of one of the four war colleges. In addition to designing the courses which comprise the curriculum, the faculty develops current, midrange, and future doctrine, generates advanced concepts, and searches for solutions to present and future Army problems.

In essence, the United States Army War College reflects the soldier-statesman philosophy of our American military tradition. With foresight it recognizes the unique challenges presented by the official duties of high level military leaders today. The college lists numerous distinguished graduates—former President Eisenhower; Army Generals Pershing, Krueger, Somervell, Patton, Clark, Bradley, Collins, Ridgway, Taylor, and Lemnitzer; Air Force Generals Vandenberg and Kenney; the Navy's Admiral Halsey and the Marine Corps' General Cates are but a few. It now directs its efforts toward swelling the list in order to assist in accomplishing United States national objectives.



Major Robert K. Sawyer, *United States Army*

THE United States Army's expansion during World War I, from a small, peacetime establishment to the greatest military force this Nation had ever assembled, astounded America's friends and enemies alike. And small wonder, for only a year before the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, the US Army was as little prepared to wage modern warfare as it had been when the Great War began in Europe in 1914. Something had transformed the Army during the months preceding America's entry, enabling it to expand quickly and efficiently and bring into the field more than 40 effective divisions during the course of the war.

When World War I began in 1914, the US Army consisted of about 4,700 officers and 87,000 enlisted men, not

including some 5,700 Philippine Scouts. Of this force about 1,750 officers and 36,000 men were assigned to coast artillery units, staff jobs, and technical and other noncombatant branches. This left a mobile or "fighting" Army of approximately 2,950 officers and 51,000 men, of which almost half was in scattered overseas stations. In the United States there were only 17 infantry regiments, 11 cavalry regiments, three (plus) regiments of field artillery, and two battalions of engineers. Overseas, mainly in Hawaii, Panama, and the Philippines, were 14 infantry regiments, three (plus) cavalry regiments, two (plus) regiments of field artillery, and four engineer companies. A comparison of the total number of units and the total strength of the Army plainly suggests

that few, if any, units were fully manned.

Small as this Army was, it was sufficient for a Nation whose foreign policy was to keep from becoming involved in the affairs of Europe. Furthermore, steps to maintain the Army in a reasonable state of efficiency had not been neglected since the end of the war with Spain. A general staff, created in 1903 when Elihu Root was Secretary of War, had persistently striven to improve its methods and organization, and on the whole the Army had tried to conform to modern standards. Perhaps its greatest weakness, aside from its size, was its disposition; units were garrisoned at small, scattered posts throughout the country and overseas. Although combined-arms maneuvers had been held about every two years since 1902, relatively few troops were involved in these exercises and not many officers had had an opportunity to direct large units.

Organized Militia

There also was the Organized Militia. As it had been since the Revolutionary War, the militia was under the control of the individual states. The efficiency of each unit depended upon the support given it by the state in which it was located. Moreover,

Major Robert K. Sawyer is with the United States Strategic Army Corps, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington. During World War II he served in Europe. Following the outbreak of the Korean War he served with the 25th Division Reconnaissance Company in Korea. He was assigned to the Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, in 1951, and subsequently served with the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe.

while militia units were required by law (1903) to conform to tables of organization established by the Federal Government, no state actually was required to maintain any militia whatsoever. A state might have no militia at all; or, if it did maintain troops, it could muster them out at any time. Nor was any state required to obey a call by the President for the services of the militia—a slender support for the Nation, indeed. In 1914 the Organized Militia of the United States comprised roughly 127,000 ill-trained officers and men.

Had the militia been summoned for service that year, and had all states responded ("An inconceivable result," wryly predicted Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison), and, further, had all militia troops been reasonably efficient and capable of taking to the field immediately, the United States in 1914 could have summoned a fighting force of Regulars and militia of about 9,800 officers and 148,000 enlisted men. The only other recourse would have been Volunteers, who would require a minimum of six months to be equipped, organized, and trained.

National Defense Act of 1916

The war in Europe stimulated serious thought in the United States. As the highly trained and well-organized armies across the Atlantic struggled in France, there grew a realization in the United States that a more realistic military policy must be adopted. Active propaganda toward this end began as early as December 1914, and a so-called National Security League tried to arouse public opinion to the point of demanding that Congress strengthen the armed services. This league was instrumental in having a resolution introduced into

the House which would authorize a commission to inquire into the state of efficiency of the Army and Navy.

President Woodrow Wilson sought to check the growing sentiment for stronger military forces on the ground that the United States traditional policy was that the country should not become an armed camp. But when the *Lusitania* was sunk in May 1915 he reversed his position and called for detailed reports from the War and Navy Departments.

Secretary of War Garrison, in his annual report published in November 1915, made specific recommendations for increasing the Army to a total of 141,843 officers and men. This Standing Army, he proposed, should be supplemented by a force of 400,000 men called the Continental Army, to be raised in increments of 133,000 a year. Members of the Continental Army would be obliged to devote specified periods of time to training over a period of three years, after which they would revert to a Reserve status for a like period. Although Mr. Garrison made no recommendations toward increasing the strength of the Organized Militia, he did suggest that additional Federal aid be granted to the various states.

President Wilson endorsed his Secretary of War's views by including them in broad outline in his annual message to Congress the following month. The President's support touched off an active popular interest in what was called "preparedness," and two plans for strengthening the armed services went before Congress in the spring of 1916. One was called the "Hay bill," from the name of the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, and the other was called the "Chamberlain bill," from

the name of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Much heated debate ensued, but a law embodying most of the features of the Hay bill was passed on 3 June 1916. This was known as the National Defense Act of 1916, and was the most important piece of military legislation enacted in the Nation's history up to that time.

Four Categories

Under the National Defense Act there were to be four classes of soldiers: Regular, National Guard (militia), Reserve, and Volunteer. The last-named would be raised in time of war only. The Regular Army was to be increased to a standing strength of 11,450 officers, 42,750 noncombatant troops, 5,733 Philippine Scouts, and "troops of the line" not to exceed 175,000. This increase would be made in five annual installments beginning 1 July 1916, although the President could make the increase more rapidly in case of emergency. The act also raised the mobile army to a total force of 65 infantry regiments, 24 cavalry regiments, 21 regiments of artillery, and seven engineer regiments, which were to be organized into divisions and brigades.

The National Guard (Organized Militia) was to be increased to 17,000 officers and 440,000 enlisted men, and organized on a sound tactical basis in conjunction with the Regular Army. All members of the National Guard had to take an oath of allegiance to both State and Federal governments, and the President could call out National Guard units for constitutional purposes. Under the National Defense Act, also, existing units and new organizations were required to conform to the regulations affecting organization, strength, and armament as laid

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Review



In midstream—the old and the new

down by the President, who could prescribe what types of units each state would maintain; and they could be assigned to divisions, brigades, and other tactical organizations. These greatly increased Federal powers made it possible to correct many of the deficiencies of the militia system.

An Officers' Reserve Corps was to be formed by commissioning civilians who qualified by examination. An enlisted Reserve Corps would be built around Regular Army soldiers who, after a three-year enlistment, dropped back into a Reserve status for four years. These Reserves, while their numbers could not be predicted, would be expected to furnish officers and soldiers in case of war who were far better trained than any Volunteers raised hurriedly at the outbreak of hostilities.

The National Defense Act was a long-range plan. The "preparedness" sought by Congress through its enactment would be several years in forthcoming. From the vantage point of hindsight it is clear that 1917, when the United States belatedly entered the war, would have found the country little better prepared militarily than it was in June 1916. The United

States Army's participation in the war undoubtedly would have been delayed for many months, and the consequences on the course of the war, although impossible to assess, are not difficult to imagine. That the US Army did enter World War I in a measure prepared, and also with the means for rapid expansion, was due to an entirely different set of circumstances resulting from the activities of a Mexican revolutionist named Francisco (Pancho) Villa.

Trouble With Mexico

Following a revolution in 1910 and the later resignation of Porfirio Diaz, dictator from 1877 to 1911, there was great unrest in Mexico. Various political factions and revolutionists struggled for power, and relations between the United States and Mexico became strained because of the anti-US sentiments evidenced by our neighbor to the south. On two occasions, in 1911 and 1913, a United States infantry division was mobilized for "maneuvers" on the border between the two countries. Early in 1914 a party of US naval personnel which had gone ashore at Tampico was arrested. This incident led, in

April, to the occupation of Veracruz by United States naval forces (later relieved by a force of Regulars from Texas). This force remained in Veracruz until July 1914, when the government then in power in Mexico collapsed. The struggle in Mexico continued, and a little later in the year Venustiano Carranza gained control temporarily.

Meanwhile, armed factions under Emiliano Zapata in the southwest and "Pancho" Villa in the north roamed the countryside. Carranza's Government was carried on by decree, the edicts of his generals in each region being the law.

Army Post Is Attacked

Recognition by the United States of the Carranza Government as the *de facto* government of Mexico provoked Villa. Certain US assistance given Carranza's troops in battles with Villa's men at points along the Arizona-Mexico border enraged him. In 1915 he swore vengeance on all things North American. He organized bands of men in the western part of his native state, Chihuahua, where he was in virtual control, and began a deliberate campaign of terror against towns and ranches across the border in the United States. There also is evidence that he hoped as a byproduct to provoke armed intervention by the United States, and planned to use this as a vehicle to bring about the downfall of the Carranza Government. Whatever his real reasons, Pancho Villa led or was responsible for many raids across the border from Mexico into the United States in 1915 and 1916.

Villa's depredations culminated in a raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on the night of 8-9 March 1916. At this time he led a force estimated at be-

tween 500 and 1,000 men across the international border, attacked an Army post at Columbus, and burned part of the town. By the time he was driven off, seven US soldiers and eight US civilians were dead, and five soldiers, two officers, and two civilians were wounded. US cavalry units gave chase and killed or wounded many of Villa's men, but as usual the Villa himself slipped back across the border and disappeared into his native hills. Brigadier General Frederick Funston, commander of the Southern Department, decided that the time had come to deal with Villa on his home ground.

On the day following the raid at Columbus, General Funston sent a telegram to the War Department requesting authority to send troops into Mexico in pursuit of Villa and his men. He sent another message on 10 March, stressing the Carranza Government's inability or unwillingness to control Villa and his activities. Apparently, the Columbus raid convinced the United States Government that similar attacks would continue as long as Villa was allowed to roam unmolested just south of the border, for the State Department hastily concluded a reciprocal agreement with Mexico which it interpreted as giving Funston the authority he desired. In a telegram on 10 March the War Department directed General Funston to organize an "adequate" military force under Brigadier General John J. Pershing, and send this force across the border in pursuit of the elements that had attacked Columbus.

The Punitive Expedition

Pershing, then stationed at El Paso, Texas, organized an expedition from units available in the Southern Department. On 14 March in his first

general order he organized this force into two provisional cavalry brigades and one provisional infantry brigade, under the designation "Punitive Expedition, US Army." He then formed a column at Columbus, with seven troops of the 13th Cavalry Regiment, the 6th and 16th Infantry Regiments, Battery C of the 6th Field Artillery, and an ambulance company; and another a few miles to the west at Culberson's Ranch, with the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 10 troops of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, and Battery B, 6th Field Artillery. On 15 March both columns marched south into Mexico.

An account of the Punitive Expedition's tactical operations is not appropriate here. For our purpose it is sufficient to know that Pershing and his force of approximately 15,000 men (at peak strength) were in Mexico from March 1916 to February 1917. During this time the expedition disorganized Villa's bands, killed several of his top lieutenants, and wounded Pancho himself. In the 11 months there were only five or six actions worthy of note. The last of these took place at Carrizal on 21 June.

From June until the following February, when it was withdrawn from Mexico, the expedition remained about 100 miles south of the border at Colonia Dublan engaged primarily in training. Although the Punitive Expedition never caught Pancho Villa (who was assassinated in 1923), it did fulfill the purpose of discouraging lawless elements from crossing the international line and molesting United States citizens and property.

During the three months of actual campaigning in 1916, the activities of the Punitive Expedition were typical of the hundreds of operations carried out by the US cavalry against the

Western Indians in the latter half of the 19th century. Cavalry was the predominant arm, and operations in Mexico centered around the capabilities and limitations of the horses and their riders. Infantry was used to guard and maintain lines of communication, but did little if any fighting. From the strictly tactical point of view, the United States Army did not learn much in Mexico that it did not already know (although it is certainly worth noting that the first instance in which the US Army employed overhead machinegun fire to support an attack reportedly occurred on 1 April 1916 at Agua Caliente).

In terms of command, General Pershing, who often was far south of his headquarters in touch with his advance columns, learned the importance of having a well-organized general staff to relieve him of minor details of administration so that he could concentrate on the military and sometimes political problems requiring solution.

Field Army Support

The real value of the Punitive Expedition lay in other fields. Most importantly, the operations in Mexico and in support of Pershing's forces pointed up a need for drastic improvements in the Army's systems of supply and transportation. Like the rest of the Army at that time, the officers and men concerned with these functions had not been trained for large-scale operations, and the Mexican adventure caught them unprepared to cope with the problems of supporting an army in the field. Had World War I overtaken the United States at this point, the Army might have been in difficult straits, indeed. Happily, the very situation that pointed up the

problems also went a long way toward solving them.

Quartermaster Corps

In the entire Quartermaster Corps there were then only 185 officers, and some of these were overseas. Most of the complicated work of procuring, storing, transporting, distributing, and repairing equipment and supplies for the Punitive Expedition fell to a hastily assembled detail of officers from other branches. This led to almost incredible confusion in the beginning, and until about the middle of April the troops with Pershing in Mexico practically lived off the country. But in the face of transportation and other difficulties a line of communications finally was established from Columbus through Colonia Dublan to San Antonio de los Arenales, 301 miles to the south, and supplies were provided thereafter in reasonable quantities.

During the remainder of the year the officers and men engaged in supplying the expedition perfected themselves in supply techniques in the field, and the Army as a whole profited tremendously by the practical experience. General Pershing later acknowledged that "under other and more pressing circumstances, it might not have been possible."

Many of the expedition's supply problems sprang from the fact that the Carranza Government would not allow Pershing to use Mexican railroads to supply his forces. This led to the extensive use of horses, pack mules, and motor transportation. The use of trucks as an expedient was both a curse and a blessing; a curse, because the methods of supplying an army in the field by truck had to be learned the hard way, under adverse conditions; and a blessing, because

many of those methods had been mastered when the greater need for them arose the following year in France.

Transportation Corps Beginning

Since the purchase of its first truck in 1907, the Army had slowly developed the motor vehicle as a means of military transportation. When Pershing organized his expedition in March 1916 only 56 automobiles and 105 trucks were in service, of which 16 were in the Southern Department. The War Department, advised that mules and horses would be unable to support Pershing adequately, purchased 588 trucks during the remainder of that fiscal year (1916). These were shipped to the border along with 57 tank trucks (for carrying water, oil, and gasoline), 10 machine shop trucks for repairing vehicles in transit, six wreckers, 75 automobiles, 61 motorcycles, eight tractors for repairing roads, and miscellaneous other road machinery and equipment. The Quartermaster General's Office forwarded tentative tables of organization for motor units and repair shops.

But it was not as easy as that. Trucks arrived in Columbus in every conceivable state of unreadiness, with no adequate equipment for assembling them. There were no provisions for repairs or for the installation of shops, and in the beginning all repair work was done in the open, dust and sandstorms notwithstanding. The first repair shops had to be manned by civilian mechanics provided by the Jeffrey Truck Company, who were supervised by an overseer from the Locomobile Company. Mechanical crews were supplemented by civilian drivers, who also drove trucks on the lines of communication and taught Army officers and men how to drive. It was seven months before shop buildings

were even constructed. From such a beginning came the present-day Transportation Corps.

But the Army was equal to the task, and by 30 June 1916 General Funston had in operation a motor transport division consisting of 10 companies of 27 trucks each, of one-ton capacity, and six companies of 28 trucks each, of three-ton capacity; and six companies totaling 66 trucks (three-ton) were either on the border or en route to the southwest from points of manufacture. A total of 12 truck companies operated along the line of communications into Mexico.

Engineer Training

In the latter connection, the extremely poor Mexican roads provided a valuable means of training the Army's engineers. When it became certain that Pershing would need a good road indefinitely for his supply line, his engineers began a program of maintenance and construction aimed at keeping the roads leading south in good condition. This was easier said than done, for the wheels of heavily loaded supply trucks sank deep into the friable alkali soil and cut great furrows that filled to the top with dust as fine as powder.

The rainy season brought about the opposite condition, so that truck columns sometimes were stuck for days during torrential rains and compelled to remain in place until the roads dried sufficiently for them to proceed. Pershing's engineers entered Mexico with no experience in coping with conditions of this exact kind, but like the officers and men in the fields of supply and transportation they learned during the year how to deal with their problems. Who can doubt that they put their lessons to good use in France a year later?

Aviation


The operations in Mexico also helped to advance military aviation in the United States. In March 1916 only one tactical air unit was in service—the First Aero Squadron, located at San Antonio, Texas. This unit was a part of the Signal Corps, and had at its disposal eight low-powered aircraft which already had been used beyond the ordinary period of serviceability.


These machines, being of limited range and poor construction, proved to be unsuited for reconnaissance and other tactical missions, and were used largely for courier work. Even then, the vast distances and high mountains were too much for their limited capabilities, and within a short time the planes were out of commission. But the Mexican experience led to more intensive training for aviators, the development of better aircraft, and the eventual reorganization of the Signal Corps aviation section.

Nor was the War Department blind to the opportunities offered by the Punitive Expedition for testing equipment. During the year 1916 thirteen types of motor trucks, representing eight manufacturers, were sent to the border for testing under field conditions. As a result, a standardized model for the Army was under production by 1917. In September 1916 a board of officers met in the Southern Department to supervise trials of various "rolling kitchens," by which troops on the march or in action could be furnished with hot soup or other substantial diet. After considering the findings of this board, the Secretary of War (Newton D. Baker) in April 1917 decided to introduce rolling kitchens into the Army at the rate of one for each company, troop, and battery of the mobile army. Still another test



Horses and mules (right) were the primary elements of mobility as General Pershing (center right) moved into Mexico. Motor transport (above and below) received its first large-scale test in the later phases of the expedition.





centered around the adoption of an adequate emergency ration, with excellent results.

Finally, operations in Mexico demonstrated that the regulation shoe of that day was too light and did not possess the wearing qualities needed for field service. Because of experiments at this time, the soldiers who went to France the following year wore a more satisfactory service shoe.

Thus in many ways the Punitive Expedition helped to prepare the US Army for its role in World War I. Without this experience, certainly, the Army would have been far less than the force that helped so much to swing the war in favor of the Allies in 1918. Still, had the difficulties with Mexico and Pancho Villa culminated solely in the dispatch of the Punitive Expedition, the United States Army would have gone to France deficient in one other very important respect. The Regular Army forces in Mexico were small, and although the officers with the expedition had an opportunity to develop practical leadership in handling units appropriate to their grades, few officers in the Army as a whole would have had that experience. What gave them the experience was the mobilization of Regular Army and National Guard units along the Mexican border while Pershing was in Mexico.

National Guard Mobilization

While the Punitive Expedition was in active pursuit of Villa, the Carranza Government grew increasingly hostile toward the United States for what it claimed was a deliberate misinterpretation by this country of the terms of the March 1916 reciprocal agreement between the two countries. By May 1916 Mexican troops reportedly were massing to attack Pershing's forces,

and there were rumors that the Mexicans might even invade Texas. For this reason, the entire Regular Army stationed in the United States, except one regiment of cavalry and a few coast artillery units, was brought to the Mexican border during the spring and stationed there.

General Funston felt that still more troops on the border would serve both as a warning to Mexico and reinforce his position if the situation got out of hand. He, therefore, requested through the War Department that units of the Organized Militia (this was before the National Defense Act) be called out to bolster his forces. The militia of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona were summoned on 9 May 1916, and began concentrating at San Antonio, Columbus, and Douglas.

Following unsatisfactory attempts to reach an understanding with the Carranza Government, President Wilson on 18 June summoned the militia of all other states. The President's call found the Organized Militia at the very beginning of a transition into the National Guard organization provided by the National Defense Act. The problems normally accompanying mobilization were increased by the fact that some units still were organized loosely as militia, others had completed the reorganization, and still others were in the process of changing. Only two infantry divisions, 19 infantry brigades, and one artillery brigade were organized as such. To have completed the transition of all units, and recruited them to full strength, would have required more time than the situation allowed.

On 23 June the commanders of the Eastern, Central, and Western Departments received instructions from Washington to send National Guard

units to the Southern Department as soon as they were reasonably equipped, without regard for division or brigade organization.

Supply Depots Unprepared

The sudden call for National Guard troops caught supply depots unprepared. A policy had been adopted in 1911 whereby the Army established depots in areas where troops might be mobilized in the event of war. Enough supplies to equip militia units as they were called into service were to be retained at these depots, along with equipment for the Regular Army. Three field depots were established—at Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco—the largest and the only one recognized by specific appropriations being at Philadelphia. Here was stored enough equipment for the militia of 16 eastern states, or the greater part of the Organized Militia. It was expected that any call for troops by the Government would come in time to permit supplies to be shipped from the depots to mobilization camps before the arrival of troops.

In actual practice, the hurried summons found the Army's supply depots greatly depleted, owing to a lack of appropriations for militia supplies, the necessity of sending part of the supplies on hand to the militia of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, and to a recent increase in the Regular Army of 20,000 men. The depot at Philadelphia, moreover, had inadequate siding facilities, which caused a considerable delay in shipping equipment to mobilization camps. The Secretary of War finally had to step in with special authority for the depots to purchase supplies on the open market, and these, together with the supplies on hand, were placed under the

control of the several department commanders for issue.

From this experience the War Department learned that the system of maintaining a small number of general supply depots for large numbers of troops was not practicable. Calls for the National Guard probably would be sudden. Supplies and equipment needed for use in the field had to be stored where they would be available immediately preferably within the limits of each state, or even in the supply rooms of the units themselves. Later in the year the Department convened a board of officers to study the question.

First Units Depart

Militia troops began leaving their mobilization camps around midnight on 26 June. The first units to leave for the southwest were a New Jersey field artillery battery, which left Sea Girt at 2300, and the 9th Massachusetts Infantry, which left Framingham less than an hour later. Other units from New Jersey and Massachusetts left their camps the following day, along with units from Connecticut, New York, Oregon, Utah, and Vermont. By 1 July, 36,042 officers and men of the National Guard were on their way to the Mexican border from all parts of the country, traveling on 122 troop trains containing more than 2,000 passenger, baggage, and freight cars. When the country celebrated Independence Day, 52,681 militia troops (not counting those of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona) were either on or en route to the border.

The National Guard organizations called into Federal service on 9 May and 18 June 1916 included 108 regiments and seven separate battalions of infantry; three regiments, 13 squadrons, and 22 troops of cavalry;

six regiments, 12 battalions, and 17 batteries of field artillery; three battalions and 11 companies of engineers; four signal battalions and 16 signal companies; one Aero squadron; sanitary troops; 23 ambulance companies; and 37 field hospitals. Altogether there were slightly over 158,000 troops, of whom about 112,000 actually served on the border at any one time. These were stationed along the whole border in moderate-size detachments and four large camps at Brownsville, San Antonio, and El Paso, Texas, and, Douglas, Arizona.

Use of Railroads

The sudden demand for transporting thousands of National Guard troops from all parts of the country to the southwest threw a great strain on the US railroads. Although the War College Division of the War Department General Staff had made a few studies concerning the mobilization of transportation equipment for war, little real consideration had been given to the large-scale use of railroads for military purposes since the Civil War. This neglect was not unnatural, for the United States' devel-

opment as a Nation had been primarily along commercial and industrial lines. And, until recent years, the Nation's relations with its continental neighbors had been peaceful and friendly on the whole.

Still, some planning had been done. There was in existence a four-man committee, appointed in 1915 by the American Railway Association at the request of the War Department. This committee had been set up with a view to eliminating some of the problems of rail congestion that were so troublesome during the mobilization of troops in 1898. The committee was composed of representatives of the Southern Railway, Chicago and Northwestern Railway, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and Central Railroad of New Jersey, but actually represented all interested lines.

Immediately after President Wilson's call on 18 June 1916, the committee met in the Office of the Quartermaster General in Washington. Here, arrangements were made to place a competent railroad official at each mobilization camp, each Army department headquarters, and in the Office of the Quartermaster General.

All photos courtesy of US War Department—National Archives

Rebuilding a bridge in Mexico



These officials were to act as advisors to Army officers at those levels on matters affecting railway transportation.

For example, when it became known that an organization was to move, the camp quartermaster would consult with the American Railway Association representative at his camp and advise him as to the strength of the organization. It was the duty of the representative to see that all railroad equipment needed for the move was assembled in time for the movement. The committee also arranged to have a Pullman representative on duty in Washington who would be notified daily as to the number of Pullman cars available in all parts of the country.

Priority Measures

The War Department also had made arrangements the preceding year to have placards, bearing the legend UNITED STATES ARMY, placed on all carload shipments of Government property in case of such an emergency. Cars so marked were to be placed in the fastest freight trains and kept moving constantly to their destinations. Upon arrival they were to be discharged and released immediately, without waiting for the bills of lading and other papers usually required by both the railroads and the Government. Cars with placards were never to be sidetracked nor shifted into yards, except to be placed in through trains, and were to be given preference and precedence for repairs.

These and other measures enabled the railroads to move nearly 111,000 troops with their equipment to the Mexican border within six weeks after the President's mid-June summons. The close cooperation between the railroads and the War Department in

1916 gave the country valuable experience in using railroad transportation for military purposes on a large scale, and established the pattern that contributed so much to mobilization during the Great War that followed.

Some idea of the railroads' task is possible when it is remembered that 350 trains totaling over 3,000 passenger cars, 400 baggage cars, 1,300 boxcars, 2,000 stock cars, and 800 flatcars were used to transport the first 100,000 men alone. Against the fabulous record of the railroads in World War II the statistics of 1916 fade a bit, but at the time it was a real achievement.

Large-Scale Training

On the Mexican border units patrolled, drilled, completed their reorganization, and grew accustomed to camp life. The War Department, recognizing a heaven-sent opportunity, used the large forces at its disposal for further developing supply and transportation techniques and testing equipment. Additional quartermaster and signal depots sprang up throughout the southwest, along with camp and base hospitals. Within a short time elaborate transportation and communications systems were in operation. All this required the greatest logistical effort the United States Army had made in many years, and the profits derived were almost incalculable.

The troop concentration also gave the Army a chance to conduct training on a large scale. This was important, for by directing such training, officers learned the difference between working out problems on paper at their service schools and actually handling large bodies of troops in the field. Moreover, at least 43 percent of the National Guard troops on the bor-

der were without former service and needed training badly.

Soon after the units began arriving, the Southern Department set in motion a rigorous training program for all troops, both Regular Army and National Guard, on the border and in Mexico. Training during the following months covered everything from marching to musketry to exercises on the brigade level, and from trench warfare to the principles of war of movement. What annual maneuvers had accomplished for European armies in the years before 1914, the large-scale training in 1916 helped in some measure to accomplish for the United States Army. General Pershing later declared that without the application of open warfare methods learned during this period, there could only have been stalemate on the Western Front in 1918.

Machinegun Companies Formed

The War Department took further advantage of the situation to complete the formation of machinegun companies in all infantry and cavalry regiments. This weapon had been introduced into the Army shortly after the Civil War, but its significance had never been appreciated fully. Development of the gun itself was slow, and although it had been evolved to a serviceable stage by 1898, its tactical use still was not understood when the Punitive Expedition went into Mexico. There were only four machineguns (*Benet-Mercié*, also called "light Hotchkiss") in each Regular Army regiment, and in less than half of all militia regiments. Machinegun units were not recognized by law until the enactment of the National Defense Act in 1916.

Following the National Guard's call to arms, the War Department ar-

ranged for mechanics from the Springfield Armory to go to the Southern Department to help instruct troops in the operation and care of the machinegun. The Army had too few *Benet-Mercié* guns to permit equipping all militia regiments, so limited numbers of a new type, the *Lewis* gun, were sent instead. The Ordnance Department employed mechanics of the Savage Arms Company as instructors for this weapon, and schools at San Antonio, Harlingen, El Paso, and other places near the border were soon in operation. In August 1916 Congress approved appropriations amounting to 12 million dollars for the procurement of new machineguns.

Development of Signal Corps

Still another important benefit accruing to the Army as a result of the country's difficulties with Mexico was in the development of the Signal Corps. By October 1916 there were in operation along the border 677 miles of buzzer and telegraph line, 642 miles of telephone line, and 19 radio stations, not to mention miles of wire along the line of communications to Pershing's headquarters and within his command. Not for many years had the Signal Corps been afforded such an opportunity to "test its wings." Furthermore, as an outgrowth of the situation, the Signal Corps in 1916 received supplemental appropriations to cover the cost of additional units and new equipment. The corps entered into negotiations with telegraph and telephone companies, manufacturers of electrical equipment, and educational institutions. In this way it obtained as Reserve officers and enlisted men civilians who possessed the technical qualifications required for service in field and telegraph battalions.

At the same time, arrangements were made for a signal supply program, based upon existing governmental regulations and manufacturing conditions. When the United States got into the war in 1917, the Signal Corps had not only the nucleus of its war personnel but complete information as to the signal materiel market as well.

The presence of large forces along the border stabilized conditions in the southwest, and the threat of attack by Carranza's troops dwindled in the latter months of 1916. Bandit raids on border towns, which had continued intermittently even after the Punitive Expedition pursued Villa into Mexico, ceased altogether. As tensions died, the War Department decided that there was no longer any need for retaining the entire National Guard on active duty. General Funston was directed to send small contingents home in exchange for troops in state mobilization camps who had not yet served on the border. Thus a sort of rotation system went into effect.

Recall of Punitive Expedition

By the end of the year, conditions had so improved that it was no longer necessary to retain National Guard troops. The Punitive Expedition, moreover, was about to be withdrawn from Mexico. A joint United States-Mexican commission had met several times in the summer and fall, and in November a protocol of agreement and referendum was signed by members of both delegations. Carranza refused to approve the protocol unless the United States withdrew the expedition, so in January 1917 President Wilson asked the War Department to move Pershing and his command north across the international line.

About the same time, Funston in the Southern Department received orders to designate 25,000 National Guard troops to be sent home for muster out of the Federal service. Two weeks later, on 16 February, the War Department directed General Funston to release all remaining National Guard organizations, including those of the border states. General Pershing returned from Mexico with the Punitive Expedition on 5 February 1917.

What the mobilization of Regular Army and National Guard troops in 1916 meant to the United States Army is perhaps best expressed in the words of the man who commanded the American Expeditionary Force in France in World War I. In *My Experiences in the World War*, General Pershing wrote:

The contingents of the Regular Army and about 156,000 National Guard troops that served on the border [in 1916] learned much that was beneficial to them in the World War. Most commands were given some tactical training and the officers had the chance to learn something of camp life and to develop practical leadership in handling units up to the regiment. The training and experience the National Guard received during their service raised their relative efficiency considerably above that attained under ordinary circumstances.

Indeed, when the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, America had at hand the means for quick expansion to the 43 divisions that helped to defeat Germany. Thanks to Pancho Villa, who set off the chain of events leading to mobilization in 1916, the US Army entered World War I far better prepared than it would otherwise have been.

SPEED in the Attack

Colonel I. Kirin, Soviet Army

Voyennyy V y e s t n i k (Military Herald), from which this article is taken, is an organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union. It is listed as a "Monthly Combined-Arms Journal" and, although rarely available outside the Soviet Union, is believed to be widely distributed within the Soviet forces. The Military Herald carries articles dealing with military tactics, training, leadership, and party indoctrination. Most tactical articles are discussions of operations at the level of the battalion or lower units.
—Editor.

THE quality of troops, the quality and adequacy of their weapons, their motivation, and the skill of their leaders—these are factors which determine the rate at which a unit advances in the attack. Massed fires can create conditions favorable to a successful attack but the rate of advance depends upon the ability of the troops to exploit a favorable situation. The better their training, the more adequate their vehicles, the more rapidly will the attack be developed.

The basic aim of an attack is the annihilation of the enemy. Annihilation can be achieved if the attacking forces deal the enemy unexpected blows, break up his organization and, by striking his flanks and rear, deny him the opportunity to reorganize and withdraw. The defender must not be permitted to maneuver his reserves. The attacker must impose his will on the enemy and retain the initiative.

Dynamic action such as this can be realized only when the attack and pursuit are conducted at a high tempo that is gradually and constantly increased. Since the enemy, equipped with modern combat materiel, is also capable of maneuvering rapidly, the attack must be rapid enough to forestall counteractions on his part. In addition, speed in the attack reduces the vulnerability of troops to the enemy's weapons of mass destruction.

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Numerous examples from the experience of the "Great Patriotic War" show how the rate of attack of the Soviet forces has increased with each new operation.

In the fighting at Moscow in 1941 during the breakthrough of the German defenses, the rate of attack did not, on the average, exceed 100 to 120 meters per hour. It took the 352d Infantry Division in the breakthrough of the main defenses on the Lama River about 48 hours to advance for a distance of three to four kilometers. This was at the turning point of the war when Soviet troops, after continual retreat, began to assume the offensive. The advances were made under very difficult conditions.

By 1942 the rate of attack of the Soviet Army had increased considerably. The troops were equipped with better weapons and materiel and had them in adequate quantities. In addition, the commanders had accumulated experience in the organization of attacks and all the troops had become accustomed to offensive operations.

At Stalingrad, for example, the enemy defenses were penetrated to a depth of five kilometers during the first day. Soviet troops attacked at a mean rate of 600 to 900 meters per hour and the encirclement was effected at a much higher rate. This was a considerable improvement and permitted the historically unprecedented encirclement of an enemy force of 330,000 men.

The Soviet forces, with every passing year, have been provided with ever-increasing numbers of high quality tanks, airplanes, recoilless artillery, and motor vehicles. The combat skill of our soldiers also has grown. This, of course, has sharply influenced

the character of subsequent operations.

At Kursk, the rates of attack averaged one and one-half times the rates in the fighting near Stalingrad. Advances were made at speeds up to 1.5 kilometers per hour.

In the attack operations of 1944 and the concluding period of the war, still higher rates of breakthrough were attained: 2 to 2.5 kilometers and, in individual cases, up to 3 to 4 kilometers per hour.

Mobility of the Future

But with modern combat means, a variety of technical equipment, complete motorization, and a high level of training in our units, even these rates of attack cannot satisfy.

Let us suppose that a motorized rifle battalion, reinforced with tanks, artillery, and other weapons, is attacking an adversary who is on the defensive. A nuclear weapon is used to assist the attack, and artillery and aviation are employed to pin the enemy down. The combat operations of the infantry will largely be conducted in their armored carriers.

The defender, also having at his disposal all modern means of combat and mobility, can deliver nuclear fires and can move his reserves quickly to close any breach in his defense.

If the attacking motorized battalion does not operate with sufficient determination to exploit the nuclear burst and to develop the attack vigorously, it will not succeed. Under these circumstances, only an attack at a high tempo can result in the destruction of the enemy.

One important condition for the attainment of a high rate of advance is timely and well-planned exploitation of nuclear fires. The commander of the battalion will know where and when

the nuclear shot is to be used against the enemy. He can plan his operation to ensure vigorous action in the direction of the burst, to save time, to anticipate enemy reactions, and to prevent him from closing the breach.

Terrain and Nuclear Effects

In establishing the direction of attack for subordinate units, the commander must choose terrain sectors that will permit rapid movement to the objective areas or into the enemy's flanks and rear. It is necessary to exploit the area damaged by the nuclear strike, but the direct route of advance to the designated objective may lie across an area where major demolitions, obstructions, and fires would delay the attack. Dense wooded areas or large inhabited places that have been struck by nuclear weapons are particularly difficult to cross. It may be necessary for the commander, in some cases, to avoid the area of the strike to save time in surmounting such obstacles.

The battalion commander is obliged to organize the rapid traversal of the area around ground zero. This movement should be made in armored carriers immediately behind the tanks at the highest feasible speed and by the shortest routes with the lowest level of radiation. It is necessary to take into account the fact that in dry weather tanks and armored carriers will stir up radioactive dust. It is necessary to cross these sectors in such a formation that vehicles will not run into a cloud of this dust.

But when it is necessary to traverse areas obstructed by nuclear explosions, troops must be capable of clearing up the obstructions and opening passages. Extensive use is made of the attached engineers and their equipment, material, and special details made up

from combat units. It must be emphasized that rifle and tank units must know how to perform work of this kind. Areas where nuclear explosions have occurred must be crossed with all possible haste. As soon as possible, partial medical treatment of personnel and a decontamination of the equipment must be accomplished without halting the attack.

Dispersion, Fire Support, Speed

As a result of the dispersion of the combat formations in modern battle, intervals, open flanks, and weakly held terrain sectors will occur. Under these conditions independence of action by the rifle or tank battalion will be considerably increased. The battalion will often operate with open flanks and companies will often be out of contact with one another. During the course of the fighting some of the subordinate units may successfully move ahead while others may be engaged in stubborn fighting or beating off counterattacks. Under such circumstances it is important for the battalion commander to provide timely fire support not only for those subordinate units that are meeting with success, but also for those which are beating off the enemy.

The wise and prompt exploitation of the results of nuclear fires is of decisive importance in the achievement of high rates of attack. But it would be incorrect to rely solely on the employment of nuclear weapons. The effective exploitation of the fire of the usual combat means also is necessary. The fire of artillery, mortars, tanks, and small arms is of exceptionally great importance in battle. It is necessary for the commander to direct the fire continuously and skillfully, concentrating it on the areas, objects, and targets which stand in the

way of successful progress. Only in this way is it possible to attain fire supremacy over the enemy and ensure a successful attack at a high tempo.

Maneuver or Frontal Attack

The achievement of speed in the attack by no means presupposes direct advance on a straight line. Under most conditions the greatest success is attained by the commander who skillfully and rapidly maneuvers on the field of battle, making use of intervals, gaps, open flanks, and weakly held areas in the enemy's defense. To force his way through, to conduct frontal attacks, means placing himself under heavy fire, suffering unjustifiable losses and, in the final analysis, not accomplishing his mission. Determined advance combined with maneuver can lead to operating with open flanks. This is not a situation to fear, for bold, determined, and unceasing movement forward, a wide or a close envelopment, creates a threat, not to our own flanks but to the flanks and rear of the enemy, for it breaks up his combat formations and demoralizes him.

Extensive employment of maneuver is, perhaps, the most characteristic trait of modern combat. Maneuver is not an end in itself and there is no utility in maneuvering simply for the sake of maneuvering. It must create favorable conditions for unexpected and coordinated attacks on the flanks and rear of the enemy and for his complete annihilation. Unless it does this, maneuvering loses meaning.

Armor and Antitank Operations

It is difficult to imagine a modern battle without the participation, on both sides, of a large number of tanks. Therefore, in the preparation of the attack, the commander must always

make provision for antitank combat, and must prepare all his personnel for this. It would be incorrect to charge only his tanks and antitank artillery with antitank combat. Antitank combat must be conducted by all the subordinate units with all the means available to them.

Rapidly moving attack can be achieved if the commander skillfully makes use, on the field of battle, of his armored carriers and other types of motor vehicles—and, if necessary, throws his infantry ahead by having them ride the tanks. In cases where stubborn and organized enemy resistance is not encountered, the subordinate units should operate on armored carriers behind the tanks. Isolated centers of enemy resistance are bypassed by the attacker or neutralized and wiped out with the fire of his artillery, tanks, and infantry. The latter will fire from their carriers while moving forward.

An important condition for ensuring a high attack tempo is the ability of the subordinate units to deploy quickly from columns into approach march and combat formations; to enter into combat from motion; and to reorganize quickly into approach march formations and march columns.

On first thought, rapid loading into and out of armored carriers seems like a matter of little consequence. But in battle, it is important. It is one thing when a trained rifle platoon loads into or out of an armored carrier in 15 seconds and another thing when it needs one or more minutes to do it. It is clear how much time can be gained or lost especially since the mounting and dismounting of personnel during the course of a battle are conducted repeatedly, and often under enemy fire.

SPEED IN THE ATTACK

Reconnaissance and Speed

Successful combat operations are inconceivable without well-organized and continual reconnaissance. Reconnaissance patrols sent out by the commanders of subordinate units in the direction of an attack and on the flanks must quickly discover intervals and gaps in combat formations, and penetrate into the depths of the enemy position to locate the enemy's nuclear means. Such reconnaissance and the prompt receipt of reliable information enables the commander to make valid decisions with respect to maneuver and helps him maintain a high tempo of attack.

Regardless of the degree of secrecy with which an attack is prepared, it is almost impossible to conceal it completely. The defender also carries on active visual and aerial reconnaissance in an effort to discover the intention of the attacker, and to establish the time of the beginning of the attack in order to take timely countermeasures. In order to avoid delivering one's fire into an empty area and conducting a fruitless attack, it is necessary, both by means of continuous reconnaissance and by individual observation, to detect regroupings of the enemy, to locate his reserves, to find weakly held places, and to know where he is and what he is doing at any particular hour.

Command Responsibilities

Only in this way will the commander be able to solve the problems of the attack creatively, to make decisions, and to engage in the most fitting form of action. Thus he will be able to influence the fighting, to retain the combat initiative in his own hands, to impose his will on the enemy, and to conduct the attack at a tempo that will not permit even a highly mobile

adversary to take effective counter-measures.

In the assignment of missions to reconnaissance elements, it is necessary to set a time limit for their completion. Belated information is of no use to anyone and may even interfere with the conduct of the operation.

Firm and constant direction of the subordinate units is also an important condition for the attainment of a high tempo of attack. It requires the ability to organize rapidly for combat, to assign missions concisely, accurately, and clearly to subordinates, to follow the progress of battle, and, when necessary, to redefine objectives promptly and direct their accomplishment. In assigning combat missions to his subordinate units, the commander of the battalion must specify the time by which they are to be accomplished, bearing in mind that delay in modern battle against a highly mobile and technically well-equipped adversary means death. Not accomplishing a mission by the assigned time, exposes the unit involved to the fire of the enemy. It also may endanger adjacent units and lead to general failure.

Momentum of the Attack

The attack must be pressed without interruption day and night. Particular importance attaches to skillful and determined action by the subordinate units in the intervals and gaps of the enemy's battle formations. On skillful action in the intervals, and on the open flanks of the enemy and vigorous progress into the depths of his position, depend, in large measures, the success of the action and the rate of advance to the objective.

A distinct, abrupt, and unexpected change of situation must not catch the commander unprepared. He must bear in mind that the situation on the field

of battle always changes rapidly. Under these conditions it does not do to wait for instructions of any kind, for this slows the attack.

One must not fear responsibility for decisions if they are aimed at the fulfillment of the concept of one's superior. In modern battle it is always important to make decisions courageously and to carry them out tenaciously. Thus is but manifested the initiative and creativeness of the commander on the field of battle. Having conquered an area or an objective, the commander must immediately organize the next decisive and bold move ahead.

Thus the necessity for subordinate units conducting their attack at a high tempo is dictated by the character of modern, combined-arms combat. A high tempo is achieved by the intelligent and vigorous exploitation of nuclear strikes, the effective employment

of the fire of all the weapons of the subordinate units, and the efficient direction of the subordinate units.

Of equal importance is the ability of the subordinate units to combine dismounted operations with operations on armored troop carriers and in march columns in close cooperation with tanks. The wide employment of maneuver, the continual waging of combat action day and night regardless of weather, the prosecution of active and deep reconnaissance, and the skill in waging battle against tanks, all contribute to the maintenance of momentum in the attack. The commander must assure conditioning of subordinate units for executing marches, and their ability to deploy quickly and engage in combat in an organized manner from the march. He must instill an inflexible desire on the part of all personnel for the achievement of victory over the enemy.

The advantages in mobility obtainable through the optimum use of new machines over the next decade may well prove comparable to those gained by the German Army through its Panzer division concept in the Battle of France. It is apparent that a new war will offer us little chance for trial and error; we cannot expect the opportunity that we had in World War II to profit from another country's mistakes; we must be right at the start.

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The developments in firepower in the future will be equally as great as in mobility. The changes will be not only in nuclear, but in nonnuclear weapons. The Army is now introducing a new family of small arms, and a new family of self-propelled field artillery into its organization. We are working on a new weapons system that, if successful, may permit a bold advance in combat vehicle design. Development of tactical nuclear weapons and their means of delivery is also going forward.

General George H. Decker



for Military Decisions

Chaplain (Major) Cloma A. Huffman, *United States Army*

THIS article is concerned chiefly with the defensibility of the assertion that "right makes might." If the formula is trustworthy, it can help a nation to win its wars; if proved trustworthy and then applied on a wise and wide basis, the formula might help to free mankind from the murdering cancer of war.

I am a chaplain, and it would be sham to pretend that the traditional stance of a clergyman does not lean toward an acceptance of Lincoln's familiar and sometimes ridiculed phrase. I am biased toward its implications, but in these pages I have tried hard to be investigative rather than apologetic.

My objective here is to discuss the relevance and reliability of three basic ethical standards which assist the military leader to make sound decisions in war or peace. My purpose will be realized if even one military leader becomes more aware of how vital is the lifeline between ethics and decision making.

To reflect upon the chances for a successful marriage between the ethi-

cal factor and the military effort, answers must be found for at least the following questions:

1. How do we define "ethical bases" and "military leadership"?
2. Are significant ethical bases common to and equally binding upon the elements of leadership in all vocations?
3. Does military life require its own peculiar set of ethics?
4. Which ethical bases are indispensable to military leadership?

Ethics

Ethics is the philosophical study of values. Usually, ethics describes broad principles which help to identify some activity as good or bad or somewhere in between these two extremes. Detailed lists of desirable or undesirable actions are not the chief concern of ethics, for it says, "You *ought* to perform whatever is required of you by competent authority."

The "ought-ness" in life is the demand of ethics, and the "whatevers" are prescribed by the principle of casuistry and enforced by technicians who are concerned with the end product. Certainly, ethics is not indifferent

to results, but it stands vigilant guard to watch over *means*. Ethics attempts to prevent contamination at the fountainhead of motivation; it forestalls the rupture of the intermediate stage of means; thus it is a sentinel which faithfully, although indirectly, protects *end results*.

Ethics applies common principles of value to widely differing tasks or vocations. For example, the prison employs an executioner whose duty is to take the life of a condemned man. That same prison employs a physician whose duty is to utilize all medical resources to save the life of any ill or injured inmate, even a death-cell convict. Executioner and physician have opposite tasks, but each must perform efficiently the work he has formally or tacitly promised to do through his vocation, for each is subject to the obligation called duty.

Thus via ethics we have come to the touchstone of all military effort. Duty is native to military life, and it is an ethical principle which is equally binding upon responsible leaders and followers in all vocations. Duty is an army's soulmate. Duty is receptive obligation formally married to and comfortably at home with the thrust of military life.

Military Leadership

Leadership often is defined as the art of influencing others to perform willingly and effectively those tasks

Chaplain (Major) Cloma A. Huffman is assigned to the Chaplain's Office, 5th Army Headquarters, Chicago. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Baylor University in 1942, and was graduated from Andover Newton Theological School in 1951. He is a graduate of the 1961 Associate Course of the United States Army Command and General Staff College.

chosen by the leader. This is a familiar and valid definition. Nevertheless, in this study, military leadership usually will refer to persons commanding or supervising the men and women who sustain military effort. Here is an intentional emphasis on people rather than on process. Without denying that leadership is both art and dynamic process, I choose to focus clearly on the decision-making leader and to keep in the background the leadership process. It is admitted that complete separation of the two is impossible.

The essential dialectic of this article grows out of the absolute standards with which ethics confronts the fallible leader. If men were infallible, ethical standards would be meaningless; then the upper ethical reaches would be the universal grasp of mankind. But no man is perfect. This is one of the cardinal facts around which this study is built.

Military life does not have exclusive property rights to duty, service of country, and sacrificial devotion to mankind's freedom-needs. However, the difficulties of the military decision maker best reveal the silhouette of man's limitations and spotlight the specter of his fallibility.

Because of human limitations, a military force of leaders and followers can be thoroughly defeated and yet completely forgiven. The fall of the Philippines in 1942, when military leaders were forced to match weakness against the enemy's strength, is an example. In other vocations, a judgment which is habitually fallible is undesirable, but in military decision making it is intolerable, for wrong decisions destroy the usefulness of any military leader. And while fallibility in man cannot be totally eliminated,

it can and must be contained or neutralized, for wrong decisions of any magnitude cannot be forgiven the military leader.

It is not difficult to understand why the military system demands of its leaders the highest possible percentage of sound decisions. The right decision of a field army commander may still result in 10,000 or more casualties among his own men. Consider, then, how costly and intolerable would be the wrong decision under the same conditions. Thus, the military leader strives hard—and drives his staff hard—to squeeze all available aid out of the various estimates and other helpful staff procedures employed prior to making his critical decisions. Is it possible for an *ethical base*—a nebulous and rather stuffy phrase—to assist that field army commander in his decision making?

Ethical Bases

Ethical bases are intangible but authoritative guides which function as reference points to enable one to measure the human values which affect, and are affected by, prospective choices. These human values are the hard core of the internal debate called decision making.

Some problems produce answers which are not debatable, for instance, $2 \times 2 = 4$. Here is certainty. However, debatable courses of action call for the use of human judgment; judgment produces decisions involving values, but in decision making, as contrasted to mathematics, there is no absolute answer inscribed in an inflexible table.

Yet the decision maker has access to reliable standards to assist him in neutralizing his fallibility. The ethical base is both a relevant and reliable agent.

An ethical base assists the military

decision maker by providing standards with which he can measure the intrinsic or deduced worth of the human factors, elements which actually dominate military effort from beginning to end. The ethical base helps the military leader to reconcile military goals with tangible materiel and intangible human values, and the essential problem which emerges is that of assigning proper priorities among mission, materiel, and men. The inviolable rule of sound decisions is that a solution must effect a functioning balance among these elements without generating a problem equal to or more serious than the original one.

I propose three specific ethical bases as complements to the usual estimates and other staff procedures used by the military leader to make sound decisions in war or peace.

Mission—A Personal Demand

When the military leader listens to the silent signals of his trained mind, he hears the formula, "The mission comes first, and the missions I am about to compose and assign must be compatible with the demands made upon me by the battle group commander."

The word "ethic" usually is alien to the commander's prebattle musings, but ethics is inevitably involved in the "firsts" and "demands" in anyone's deliberations. "Firsts" and "demands" presuppose both value and authority, and the scaling of values under authority is ethics in action. Thus ethics and military effort go hand in hand.

The primary standard against which all military effort must be measured is the demand of mission. Mission is as necessary to the ethical bases of military leadership as authority is to

the military structure itself. Mission is military authority translated from the clearly described theories of the manual into the compellingly prescribed tasks of combat.

In essence, the ethical base of mission means that it is right and natural for one to be required to perform tasks which, although personally repulsive and perhaps fatal, are necessary for the preservation of one's society—tasks so imperative that failure to perform them would only generate problems of still graver consequence.

The ethics of mission is not predicated on the fear of punishment associated with failure-to-comply. Rather, the ethic of mission constrains a man to perform assigned tasks because of the compelling motivation to react responsibly to the interpersonal demands of an organized society.

This ethical base helps the fallible decision maker to orient himself toward the realities of life. *As an ethical base, mission means that we live in the kind of a world where it is right and natural for one person to require another person to do something on behalf of both.*

Now arises a perplexing question. Is there ever an occasion when a follower should not perform the leader's assigned mission? Here is where a soldier's agony can prove as sharp—and as fatal—as a knife in the ribs.

There are missions, formally assigned, which men may refuse to perform, and still be on sound military ground. For example, Hitler's genocidal measures, which took the lives of six million European Jews, were realized through the assignment of a basic mission ("Solve the Jewish problem!"), which, in turn, was broken down into thousands of specific and formally assigned tasks.

At any level of command, a military leader or follower, by the application of this ethic alone, would have been justified in refusing to help kill the hapless Jews. Grand Admiral Raeder of the German Navy is an example of a high-caliber military leader by any country's standards. As head of the German Navy, he consistently opposed Hitler's anti-Jewish and antireligious measures. At last, on 30 January 1944, he resigned from his post, because of a wide gap between him and Hitler on many vital issues. Raeder says, "For me, too, as for others, there existed a limit beyond which I would not have consented to follow Hitler."

This is the conclusion, then, that I draw at this point: *A decision is not a tenable military solution when its execution has a 100 percent probability of generating, not just one, but a multitude of problems, each of which is of graver consequence than the failure to perform the mission.* If one holds consistently to this position, it could cost him his life. However, in the last analysis, I see the risk of life for a principle of conscience fully as justifiable as the risk of life in the highly impersonal varieties of combat—in which we seldom see the enemy who slays us, and by which we are doing battle for a principle—often less real and less compelling.

Maturity—A Personal Guide

The corollary of the interdependency that gives rise to the ethical base of mission is the inwardness in life that is spirit. Plainly a man is more than the water and blood and flesh and bones within his skin.

Against the microcosm of man come impinging, damaging forces. Weather, terrain, germs, preying animals, and hostile men are among the foremost

external opponents which confront a man. To control or destroy these outward threats, man learns to employ hard weapons. However, only by means of internal guides, developed in patience and with finesse, does man mature sufficiently to learn what he may rightfully do with his hard weapons.

The ethical base of maturity is a guide which leads man to the goal of inner growth as the means by which he develops the spirit. A man's spirit is what he inwardly is, and this quality ultimately determines what he can and will do when required to make a key decision or trigger a rifle.

Maturity implies that men need to outgrow childlike reactions such as dependency, ignorance, and irresponsibility. Sometimes religious and military authorities attempt to banish these immature reactions by fiat. However, it is the process of growth rather than edict which dissolves man's immaturity.

We have already accepted the general principle of man's fallibility. How, we now ask, does this frailty of spirit express itself? Specifically, what are the internal enemies against which the military decision maker must protect himself, lest his capacity to make decisions be impaired?

Arrayed against the achievement of maturity are not one but many destructive traits. They range from apathy to vanity and from arrogance to vengeance. Together they engage man's spirit in an unceasing struggle for the achievement of those qualities which we usually call character.

It is with the aid of character that, slowly and painfully, the spirit develops as the agent of the active inwardness of man. An airplane is mechanically assembled, but a man painfully matures. He is fortunate if his hour

of danger, his moment of truth, is not thrust upon him prior to his reaching maturity of spirit, for it is the closely knit formation of character which is his best defense against fallibility.

The ethic of maturity is a guide for personal development. To grow up in spirit is to be like Abraham Lincoln, whose contrast with Hitler is obvious. Interestingly enough, they did have one huge piece of ground in common: both superficially participated in military campaigns, and in later life both, untrained in strategy, were responsible for conducting a major war on whose outcome hinged the fate of a nation. In character composite and war outcome, they had nothing in common. Thus General Gunther Blumentritt, Chief of Operations of the German Army High Command, wrote in January 1942:

It must be realized that Hitler was not a realistic statesman. He never regarded politics as the sober pursuit of a definite end. For him, politics was a dream, and he the dreamer, ignoring alike time, space and the fact that power was limited and Germany only a small patch on a large globe. . . . He himself, as a private in the First World War, had served only in the West. . . . He was impervious to all warning voices. . . . Hitler simply refused to believe his commanders and staff.

What are some of the important sortities which the ethic of maturity can mount on behalf of man and his internal struggle to grow up? I list the following character traits and point out that all are needed by both the military leader and follower: courage, honor, truthfulness, humility, integrity, diligence, loyalty, vision, kindness, faith, individuality, hope, fairness, good humor, tenacity, tem-

perance, wisdom, and sacrificial love.

The ethic of maturity says to the military leader:

Grow up! Become a man! Decision making, when life and death are at stake, is not a job for the immature. This man-sized job is common to a cereal salesman and a platoon leader. But beware! The wrong decision by the cereal salesman will lose customers—at worst, his job—but the wrong decision by the platoon leader can kill every man in the platoon and jeopardize the company and battle group as well.

What is the hard core of maturity? Is it a reliable ethical guide for the military leader? *Maturity is the attitude of cheerful and creative acceptance of life's experiences and potentialities.* Unless one is content to place the conduct of military operations in the hands of children and adolescent youth, it must be admitted that the stability of maturity is a prerequisite to military leadership.

This willingness to accept what life brings is neither sterile stoicism nor fatalistic resignation nor docile consent. The ethic of maturity produces a cheerful and creative acceptance (which is highly contagious) of life's good and bad days, of challenging and dreary assignments.

That trait at its very best was characteristic of George C. Marshall. His initial overseas assignment in the Philippine Islands was of the dullest kind. In France, he became a well-nigh indispensable staff officer and thus was denied his burning desire to lead men in combat. Among his later assignments were some that, we know, taxed his devotion and patient spirit. In World War II he almost led the Normandy invasion—but did not. And yet there is a solid foundation for Presi-

dent Harry S. Truman's assertion that Marshall (when he was yet alive) was "the greatest living American." Maturity of spirit is at least a major part of the explanation of Marshall's greatness.

Unity—A Personal Resource

Unless one is an atheist, there is no reluctance to admit that life, with its outward reach toward the demands of fellow-citizens and its inward spirit which achieves meaning, also is characterized by an upward thrust toward the ultimate resource called God.

The strongest bond of unity among men is the companionable state we call fellowship rather than the formal demand-response relationship of mission. Fellowship is a religious term essentially, and its unity is the cohesive loyalty of widely varying men with a common faith in an active God. As if anticipating how scarce our religious unity and how frequent our wars, the psalm writer wistfully commented, "Behold, how good and pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity" (Psalm 133:1).

Unity provides an ethical base for military effort as a resource of strength originating beyond but abiding within man. This upward seeking by man, although often disguised by profane masks, is a restless yearning for fellowship—genuine companionship—with God. As St. Augustine said, "Our hearts are restless until they find their rest in God."

Let me now demonstrate, using military rather than religious argument and evidence, that this ethic of unity is a relevant and reliable resource of great value to the military leader.

America's experiences in postwar Japan validate the reliability of this ethic. Our country's decision not to

depose the Japanese Emperor was, in part, a wager on the adequacy of this ethic of unity.

A brief treatment of so complex an issue will oversimplify facts, but this ethic of unity became the *modus operandi* of American occupation policies. After she had helped to conquer Japan, America took a mature in-look and found she had no heart for an attitude of vengeance. She took a strategic out-look toward wide oceans, now reduced to spit-across size, and decided it was no time for another retreat into isolationism. Not happily but with much at stake, America decided to build on the ethical principle of unity.

Japan was disarmed but not humiliated. Everything possible was done to preserve the maximum of Japanese unity consistent with reasonable security. The Emperor was left untouched, for he was the keystone of Japanese unity. Allied figures of authority respected the Emperor and used his unifying influence to help lift a badly beaten people back to dignity.

Contrast this use of the ethic of unity with the rejection of that same principle when the Germans overran the Ukraine and were welcomed by the Communist-dominated people as liberators. The conquerors were required to implement policies based on an assumed Aryan superiority. The results are too well-known to merit repetition: German leaders paid a terrible price for the decision to deny the reality of an indispensable ethic.

Now shift the scene back to Japan. From August 1950 through late 1953, Japan's former enemies placed themselves in a situation which was utterly ridiculous—unless the ethic of unity is a reliable resource. While the

United Nations forces had mountains of supplies in Japan for use in Korea, there was scarcely enough UN combat strength in Japan to stop any organized attempt to destroy the vital stores. Yet these same Japanese, graduates of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, never struck a single revengeful blow at their enemies of only five years before.

How could this have happened? America approached Japan's critical problem of rehabilitation with her 1945 policies which included the ethical base of unity. In 1950-53 Japan repaid that ethic in the same coin. The trust of American strategic decision makers in the reliability of this ethic was fully justified.

The ethical base of unity is a giant step for man, for such a move brings him close to God with all His power. This ethic is an indispensable resource for the military decision maker, because *the ethic of unity is the aiming circle set firmly into the prize ground of man's highest value—his spiritual nature*. Through his spiritual nature, man discovers that he is kin to God, and this realization urges him toward the goal of companionable fellowship with his brothers, Everyman.

Decisions which are based upon and are compatible with the ethic of unity are foremost among man's critical decisions. In the 1770's American leaders—some young and some old but all mature in spirit—declared: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal. . . ." What seemed a dividing stroke proved to be a unifying wager which has paid off in the coin of strength for both the United States and Great Britain, not to mention every other country which has sent its "poor and homeless" to these shores.

Right Makes Might

I conclude that military effort needs three basic ethical standards, regardless of what we call them. There must be a value-standard sensitive to the horizontal nature of our interdependency, a value-standard geared to our individual subjectivity, and a value-standard which alerts us to an involvement with a transcendent Force-principle called God—and even better described as “Our Father Who art in heaven. . . .” I have called these bases mission, maturity, and unity.

I submit that being right within one's self, doing right to others (consistent with a life in which character-virtues operate), and being right before God, is a difficult and elusive but indispensable principle toward which men must strive and on which they can depend. The endeavor to be and to do right generates great power within an individual or a nation, power which has been validated sufficiently to justify the assertion RIGHT MAKES MIGHT.

Note that Lincoln said “right makes might,” which is different from saying that right is might. The former

posits a necessary cooperative striving by men, a struggle which only men can wage. Furthermore, Lincoln set this formula in between two cardinal concepts: faith that right makes might and the imperative of doing our duty.

If any man is tempted to believe that a Big Bang in the hand is worth more than the reliable truth of Lincoln's dovelike phrase, then let him remember this: Evidently Abraham Lincoln knew some things (about God, His immutable laws, men, and war) which Hitler and his kind never learn. Placing their calculated reliance on combat power and military prowess alone, the tyrants of all ages debunk and discard the truth in Lincoln's formula, but they destroy themselves when they rely on the assumption that might alone makes right.

His words and even more his war bid us say with Lincoln that it is militarily sound for a nation and a man to:

. . . have faith that right makes might, and in that faith . . . to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it.

Our lives need a purpose; we need a direction in which to point our efforts. And we should aim high. When we raise our sights, when we pursue the highest goals of our society, we are taking part in the never-ending effort of man to realize the best that is in him. When man reaches toward the highest goals that he can conceive, his efforts, his achievements give meaning to the phrase—“the dignity of man.”

Admiral Arleigh Burke



The Importance of Greece to NATO

Major General Andrew Siapkarak, *Greek Army*

IN AN alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there are two main reasons for a reevaluation of geographical areas. First, the revision of tactics caused by new weapons with new capabilities may make a reevaluation desirable. Second, there is always the danger that old evaluations are in error or that changed conditions have made them obsolete.

The importance of Greece to NATO in the defense of Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean will be discussed in this article in its major aspects, to include its land, sea, and air-space; material and industrial resources; and manpower.

Assuming that a future war will be a total war, that it will be conducted with increasingly destructive means, and that such a war will have to be

served by the entire economy, it becomes obvious that movement assumes great importance. The anticipated rate of destruction will be higher than ever before, and modern technique calls for more means in less time.

In practice, movement is dependent upon transportation and lines of communications. This implies transportation and communications by sea, since the bulk of transportation, in the event of a major conflict, will be served by sea lines. Overland transportation is, in effect, an extension of that by sea, while air transportation represents a small percentage of the entire task.

The Mediterranean, therefore, has


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not been deprived of its strategic importance but, on the contrary, possesses even greater significance, for it affects strategy on a larger scale. Oil is still a basic strategic material and the Middle East holds the largest reserves in the world. The Mediterranean controls the Middle East and provides the shortest and cheapest route for transporting its products. This fact affects not only the Medi-

Land Space

The mainland of Greece occupies the major part of the Balkan Peninsula and provides the bases and roads which are necessary to movements toward Southeast Europe.

Generally, it has been admitted that, in World War I, the creation of the Balkan Front greatly contributed to the outcome of the war. In World War II, although the creation of such a



Fertile valleys provide a large portion of the agricultural products of the country

terranean countries (Southern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East) but Europe and its islands. The Mediterranean is not only a route for transporting the means for waging war to the theaters of operations, but is a source of potential.

Focal areas in the Mediterranean remain: the Gibraltar Straits, the Sicily-Tunis sea passage, the Otranto Strait, the Dardanelles-Bosporus Straits, and the Suez Canal.

front in this area was considered to be desirable strategically, it was never established.

The Greek Peninsula is the gateway to the southeastern region of Europe, the Black Sea, and Asia Minor. It has an immediate bearing on the peoples and countries of Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Its possession thus adds to the strength of the power ruling the Mediterranean. The loss of the Greek Peninsula

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would cause the loss of the Eastern Mediterranean. This was proved in World War II, and is more evident today when modern means of war are characterized by increased range and effectiveness.

The loss of the Eastern Mediterranean would mean the loss of maneuvering space, thus condemning the war potential in this maritime theater to inactivity.

Should the ruler of Central and Eastern Europe, the Ukraine, and Transcaucasia threaten the communications in the Mediterranean and achieve free access to the south, through the Adriatic and the Black Seas, the Greek Peninsula, in conjunction with its sea and airspace, would support operations to force the opening of these waters. They would provide bases and protected access for further operations to the west, south, and east; and provide the tactical advantages of outflanking of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, the focal area of the straits. The Greek Peninsula provides access to this area without requiring a frontal attack.

Such a frontal attack against the strongly fortified points of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus would be highly vulnerable to both conventional and mass destruction weapons and would require special operations and large troop concentrations in a very limited area.

Summing up, the possession of the Greek Peninsula, in conjunction with more effective weapons and improved launching methods, makes action feasible in a greater depth than would otherwise be possible. It is the central land area controlling the Mediterranean's four focal areas; the Sicily-Tunis sea passage, the Otranto Strait,

the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and the Suez Canal.

Sea Space

The Greek sea space, including the Ionian Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Sea of Crete, and their chains of islands, constitutes a vital portion of the Eastern Mediterranean. More specifically, in regard to the Eastern Mediterranean's four focal areas, the importance of the Greek sea space can be analyzed as follows:

The Ionian Sea is vitally important to the Otranto Strait. Operations from this area economically can control the Otranto Strait and the Sicily-Tunis sea passage.

The Aegean Sea is an area of paramount importance to the Dardanelles-Bosphorus Straits and an area which, in conjunction with the Sea of Crete, enables one operating from it to gain great advantages in the effort to control the Suez Canal.

The Sea of Crete supplements the capabilities provided by the Ionian and Aegean Seas and enables free maneuvering of naval forces for command of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In addition to the strategic importance, defined above, out of the 300 Greek islands, more than 100, owing to their nature, disposition, and installations therein, in conjunction with the Greek Peninsula, give the Greek seas a special tactical importance. These islands favor all kinds of naval operations; permit the support of naval operations by land and air forces, and, as an extension of the Greek mainland, favor special amphibious and airborne operations. Control of the Greek sea space results in control over all the ports and coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Airspace

Control of the airspace over the mainland and seas of Greece enhances utilization of the land and sea forces. It provides these forces with security and permits their reinforcement. Irrespective of the above, however, the Greek airspace, viewed in conjunction with the range of the active and passive means of modern airpower, provides the defense of the Mediterranean



The Megdova hydroelectric and irrigation works

nean with a shield to protect it from the most dangerous avenues of approach from the north and the east. It is from this area that the greatest air and guided missile threat may exist. Its central position and its proximity to vital and sensitive spots to the north and east make the Greek airspace strategically significant.

A strategic analysis of the Greek area discloses that Greece provides a shield for defense and a sword for threat against the continental power to the north and against seaborne forces to the south.

If theory out of expediency does

not support these arguments, irrefutable historical fact exists to prove them. Since the dawn of time the Greeks, although a peace-loving and liberal people, have been drawn into every Mediterranean conflict, irrespective of place or cause.

On the other hand, the nature of the Greek wars—all of them defensive wars—discloses the strategic value of Greece for him who proposes to introduce a new order of things into the Mediterranean area, no matter whether he is called Caesar, Mussolini, Hitler, or something else. By her location and importance, Greece drags her ill-chanced people into war.

Material Resources

Material resources of Greece can be categorized as minerals, agriculture, trade, and industry. A wide variety of rich ores are to be found in the country. These include bauxite, chromium, iron, lead, zinc, nickel, and magnesium. Agricultural products are tobacco, raisins, cotton, grapes, wine, alcohol, oranges, olives, and olive oil.

Although efforts to industrialize Greece started only a short time ago, a significant industrial base has developed. Statistics recently published by the United Nations on industrial progress from 1948 to 1957 show that Greece attained a 156 percent increase during that period. New industries have been established which include shipyards, oil refineries, electric power, and nitrogen plants. Greece exports clothing, ammunition, explosives, cement, leathers, shoes, and chemical and pharmaceutical products.

The country's electrification, having been greatly expanded in the last five years, will contribute to a further increase in agricultural and industrial production. Industrial production, and particularly the production of chemi-

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The Prime Minister reviews Greek armored units (above). Troops of the Royal Hellenic Navy pass in review (below).





The realities of contemporary life have produced a proud and hardy race

cals and drugs, will improve agricultural production.

The Greek merchant marine plays an important part in international trade. The merchant marine includes not only ships under the Greek flag (679 ships of a total gross tonnage of 2.3 million tons) but also ships, which, although under foreign flags, belong to Greeks. Approximately 1,859 ships (including 161 presently under construction) of a total gross tonnage of about 16 million tons are owned by Greeks. Thus Greece, with one-sixth of the world's capacity, occupies third place, after the United States and Great Britain, in world shipping.

The business initiative of the Greeks, the quality of the new ships, the fact that the distribution of these



Greece possesses a rich heritage of ancient culture.—All photos courtesy of Greek Information Service.

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ships into categories is well-balanced, and that most of them are owned by individuals and operated as free enterprises, all add to the potential of the merchant fleet.

Bearing in mind that, in a future world war, transportation and sea lines of communications will assume increased importance, one may appreciate the strategic significance of Greece not only within the limited area of the Mediterranean but far beyond it.

Manpower

The Greek race, in its present form, is the product of its geographical environment. It has grasped the meaning of the problems which life in this environment has presented and, in countering them, has developed qualities necessary to survive. Hellenism, because of its continuous struggles for survival, has not increased in strength and population. There are 10 million Greek people in Greece and 2.5 million scattered throughout the world.

Greek manpower gives the alliance to which she belongs a moral strength, because her people are known as just, liberal, democratic, and idealistic. The Nazi invasion in World War II was countered with well-known courage and determination. Conditions undoubtedly predicted the immediate outcome. Even capitulation in advance would have seemed reasonable and honorable to the most prejudiced critic. Nevertheless, Greece resisted. It is in this apparent absurdity that

one may find the main trait of the Greek race—the Greek's conception of responsibility toward history.

Armed Forces

The country's armed forces (which include an army, navy, air force, special raiding forces, and parachutists), although relatively small and without adequate modern equipment, are considered to occupy an outstanding place among Europe's modern armies. This can be attributed to the quality of manpower, and the efficiency and combat experience of the cadre. All officers in the grade of captain and above have a good deal of combat experience.

The Greek conception of an alliance is another factor which must be borne in mind when evaluating the armed forces of the country. The Greek, as proved, considers allied affairs to be his own. As for war operations, no matter where conducted, he considers them to be a common affair, irrespective of time and place.

Summary

Summing up, one may assert that Greece, as a geographical area, is a key to the Eastern Mediterranean. As a source of material goods and human activities, her influence surpasses the limits of the Mediterranean. Hellenism has played a leading part in the cause of freedom and democracy, both in ancient and recent past. Greece, based on "quality," still retains a leading role in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean and exerts influence far beyond it.

Greek

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MILITARY

NOTES

UNITED STATES

'LARC-5' Contract Awarded

The United States Army has contracted for the production of 230 all-aluminum *LARC-5* amphibians. The *LARC-5* (Lighter, Amphibious, Resupply, Cargo, 5-ton capacity) is the modern successor to the *DUKW* of



LARC-5 amphibian

US Army

World War II, and can carry twice the tonnage of the *DUKW*. Unlike its predecessor, which was essentially a truck with amphibious capabilities, the *LARC* emphasizes water capabilities as exemplified by its marine hull design. It has a water speed of about 16 kilometers per hour and can travel up to 48 kilometers per hour on land.

The *LARC-5* will be powered with an "off-the-shelf" V-8 270-horsepower industrial gasoline engine, making it

unnecessary for the Army to maintain large stocks of engine repair parts.—News release.

US Army Tests Italian Jet

The *Fiat G-91*, a small jet, has been loaned by the Italian Government for testing by the United States Army Aviation Board at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The *G-91*, already employed by many of the NATO nations as a lightweight strike-reconnaissance aircraft, is capable of operating off small unimproved runways.

The *G-91* is one of many aircraft that the US Army Aviation Board is using to develop data on the problems



US Army

Fiat G-91

of high-speed flight at low levels. It is hoped that useful data can be assembled for the development of future surveillance aircraft.—News release.

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National Guard Guerrilla Units

The Army National Guard has reorganized its Special Forces personnel (guerrilla and antiguerrilla) into company-size units, in order to bring them under the same tables of organization and equipment as those of their Active Army counterparts. The National Guard trains guerrilla and antiguerrilla specialists in five states: Ala-



US Army

Personnel of the 118th Special Forces Operational Detachment team, Alabama National Guard, load for a training jump bama, Louisiana, North Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia. Prior to reorganization, the National Guard units lacked administrative and other support-type members. Each company now has sufficient administrative and supply personnel to support its own 12-man operational detachments. Training goal for the guard units is readiness for combat theater use in a relatively short time after mobilization. —News release.

Electronic Check Of Army Aircraft

Electronic checkout techniques, similar to those used in missile launchings, are being tested on Army aircraft as a means of determining if the airplanes are safe for flight.

Army-sponsored research into the feasibility of this procedure is known as Project ALARM, for Automatic Light Aircraft Readiness Monitor. The concept envisions the use of strategically placed sensors to forecast electronically the condition of various critical mechanical and structural components, thus saving valuable man-hours in carrying out maintenance inspections on Army airplanes and helicopters.

Use of electronic monitoring could reduce the inspection time to a matter of minutes and, in addition, may conceivably remove some of the requirements for special skills on the part of inspection and maintenance personnel. A most important byproduct of such a system would be the improved safety factor.

Under the ALARM system sensors are installed at critical points in the engine, transmission, drive shaft, bearings, propeller or rotor, and at selected sites in the structure. These are connected to a central control panel where the pilot or maintenance personnel can literally tell at a glance the status of the aircraft. The ALARM system incorporates self-testing circuitry, which makes the system virtually foolproof.

In the initial version, ALARM will simply tell the monitor operator that "something" is wrong with the particular structural area or mechanical part of the aircraft. In the future, it may be possible for the system to report the actual condition of the structure or component.—News release.

New Triservice Aircraft

Separate and unrelated announcements have been made of programs to develop two aircraft suitable for use by all three military services of the United States.

A triservice program is under way to develop a prototype vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) transport for operational and technical research. The program will utilize information

leased transcript of hearings before the House Armed Services Committee. Such an aircraft is visualized as having wings which would be perpendicular to the fuselage during takeoff and landing and adjusted to a swept-back position in the air. The perpendicular position of the wings would afford the advantage of low takeoff and landing speeds and the ability to operate from



Artist's concept of proposed VTOL transport (right) and the mockup of a fuselage for such an aircraft as proposed by one manufacturer (above)



obtained from numerous test bed programs and studies conducted by the various services and NASA which have proved the feasibility of the VTOL concept.

First step in the VTOL program will be a design competition based on specifications developed by the Navy in cooperation with the Air Force and the Army. Joint funding for this project is assured.


A second program, designed to develop a fighter interceptor for use by all the services, was announced by the Secretary of Defense in a recently re-

leased transcript of hearings before the House Armed Services Committee. Such an aircraft is visualized as having wings which would be perpendicular to the fuselage during takeoff and landing and adjusted to a swept-back position in the air. The perpendicular position of the wings would afford the advantage of low takeoff and landing speeds and the ability to operate from

short landing surfaces. The swept-back position would reduce drag and increase operating range during sustained flight.

The Secretary of Defense has described the aircraft as a "new triservice tactical fighter specifically designed to meet the requirements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps . . . a fighter which could operate from the large number of existing smaller airfields all over the world and yet fly without refueling across the ocean, thus greatly increasing its value for limited war purposes."—News item.

New High Powered Searchlight



US Army

New 30-inch searchlight

The US Army Engineers have developed a 30-inch general purpose searchlight which has twice the range and intensity of the present standard 60-inch light.

A high-intensity liquid-cooled carbon arc mounted in a 30-inch parabolic reflector produces 450 million peak-beam candlepower. Mounted on a trailer that can be towed by a 1/4-ton utility truck, the new light can be operated from its trailer or unloaded by two men and operated from the ground.—News release.

'Levacar' Railroad Vehicle

Several major rail lines in this country have expressed an interest in an air-cushion rail vehicle now being developed by a United States manufacturer. Designated the *Levacar*, the wheelless vehicle is designed to ride slightly above the rails on a thin film of high-pressure air, thus eliminating friction which is the greatest

barrier to high-speed rail travel.

The current concept visualizes self-contained rail cars capable of carrying from 40 to 200 passengers at speeds of 240 to 800 kilometers per hour. Each car would have its own jet engines driving propellers to provide forward thrust.

The largest *Levacar* built to date is a single passenger model, but a 200-passenger version is now being designed for test operation between New York and Philadelphia. This carrier, called the *X-5* will weigh 76,000 pounds, and should make the trip between the two cities in 38 minutes at a speed of 240 kilometers.

The heart of the *Levacar* concept is the "levapad" devices on which the vehicle rides. Levapads glide above the rails to support the car and along the side of the rails to guide it. Tubes from a central compressor carry high-pressure air to the levapads.—News item.

Rocket Belt Test Flights

First public demonstration of the Army's experimental "rocket belt" (MR, Nov 1959, p 80) was made in June of this year, after more than two years of feasibility studies and flight tests. Developed under contract with the Army Transportation Research Command, the mechanism demonstrated is described as "an experimental rocket lift device to achieve individual controlled free flight over the ground."

A test engineer has made lateral flights of up to 110 meters and flights to the top of nine-meter hills. In demonstration he has cleared trucks and

on a fiberglass corset. Two padded lift rings are attached to the corset. Metal control tubes, attached to the lift rings, extend forward on each side of the operator. A control stock on one tube permits the operator to alter his flight direction. On the other side, a motorcycle-type hand throttle allows the wearer to regulate thrust levels for vertical control. In flight, the operator controls pitch and roll by body movements.

Activated by the operator's controls, hydrogen peroxide is forced under pressure into a gas generator where it encounters a catalyst and de-



Demonstration flight by rocket power

US Army

other obstacles. Although maximum speeds have not been attempted, the average speed in tests has been estimated at 32 kilometers per hour.

Weighing less than 100 pounds, the device consists of a twin-jet hydrogen peroxide propulsion system mounted

composes into steam. When the steam escapes through two rocket nozzles, it provides a thrust of about 280 pounds. Main thrust is directed toward the ground. Jet deflectors provide thrust for yaw control when activated by the operator.—News item.

Three-Dimensional Radar

A radar display device recently unveiled affords the operator a three-dimensional picture of targets on a



Three-dimensional *Stereoscan* (left) and three-dimensional radar antenna (right)

single viewing screen. Three-dimensional data on most current radars requires two screens, one a plan-position

indicator and the second a range-height indicator. With the new *Stereoscan* device the operator can, in effect, see a portion of the earth's surface, including the airspace above it, and everything within that space.


The *Stereoscan* is said to be easier to view with greater accuracy than conventional systems. The display requires no dark adaptation by the viewer and may be viewed by several



Old and new radar displays

observers in a normally lighted room. Existing three-dimensional radar provides the necessary input data, and the display system can be built relatively inexpensively from currently available components.—News release.

SIDE VIEW OF 3-D STEREOSCOPIC DISPLAY



GREAT BRITAIN



Air-cushion stretcher carrier

New Air-Cushion Vehicles

Three new air-cushion vehicles have recently been displayed in England. One, of possible military application, is an air-supported stretcher carrier which provides a jolt-free ride for patients. This prototype was devel-



Aerocraft vehicle

oped by an aircraft company in collaboration with the Royal Army Medical Corps. It is powered by two small gasoline engines.




Photos courtesy of
British Information Service
British Skimmer

A home-built aluminum and plywood hovering vehicle designated the *Aerocraft* is nearing readiness for flight tests. A third vehicle built by students of the College of Aeronautical and Automobile Engineering, Redhill, England, has been designated the *Skimmer*. Although designed for a single passenger, it can lift five men. —News release.

Rocket-Powered Ejection Seat

A new rocket-powered ejection seat for aircraft has been developed and successfully tested by a British manufacturer. Designed to permit pilots to bail out at extremely low altitudes, the new seat will propel the pilot clear



British Information Services

New rocket-powered aircraft seat

of his aircraft and to sufficient altitude to permit safe parachute descent. In the first manned test a pilot was pushed to an altitude of 107 meters by two rockets mounted beneath the seat.—News release.

Wire Bridge

A method of crossing vehicles over a river or chasm on a bridge made of

steel cables has been developed by The Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. In a recent test in England, a *Land Rover* general purpose vehicle was fitted with special grooved rims attached outside of each conventional wheel. The vehicle was then driven along two steel cables suspended across a 110-foot gap.



Land Rover on cable bridge

The grooved rims engaged the cables to support the vehicle as it moved across the span.

Usual methods of bridging a gap of this size would have required about 60 tons of bridging materials.—News item.

AUSTRALIA

Papuan Jungle Regiment

Undisciplined Papuan and New Guinea jungle-dwellers have been converted into trained soldiers of the Australian Army, as members of an 800-man Pacific Islands Regiment. The cunning and bushcraft of the islanders, according to their Australian officers, make them first-class army material. The present regiment had its origin in 1940 when New Guineans, willing to fight the Japanese, were organized into a body known as the Papuan Infantry Battalion. Adept at jungle fighting, the unit was an outstanding success. After many organizational changes since World War II, the present regiment has emerged.—News item.

SWEDEN

Helicopters To Sweden

The Swedish Navy and Air Force have contracted for six *Vertol 107* helicopters, according to an announcement by the Royal Swedish Naval Administration. The *107*, a smaller version of the United States Army's *HC-1B Chinook*, eventually will be



107 transport helicopter

used by all three military services, the naval administration said, as Sweden desires to exploit the logistic advantages of employing one aircraft common to the entire defense establishment.—News item.

USSR

Snowplow Design

A one-man snowplow designed and constructed by a Soviet officer is described as so simple to build that it "can be made in a workshop from odds and ends." Basically, it consists of a welded steel frame with attached rotary system.

Operated by one man, it is reported capable of throwing snow a distance of 10 meters, and of removing 12 cubic meters of snow per hour. The machine is intended for use in removing snow from trenches, fortifications, and engineer construction work.—News item.

WEST GERMANY


Service School Increase

The number of service schools under the control of the Ministry of Defense will be increased from 37 to 50 in the near future. These schools will have a total capacity of 12,000 students and will provide career soldiers with training in technical and administrative fields.—News item.

FRANCE

'Ramjet' Drone

The French-produced *CT-41* ramjet target drone has been licensed for production in Great Britain and the United States under the terms of recently concluded commercial agreements. The *CT-41* is a Mach 2.5 air vehicle built in two versions, one suitable for employment at high altitudes, and one for use at low altitudes. It



CT-41 target drone

contains an autopilot, controlled by radio signals from the ground, and is launched from a zero length ramp by two solid propellant booster rockets carried under the nose section. The boosters separate from the airframe as the drone reaches speeds over Mach 1.3. Two ramjet engines sustain the target drone in flight.—News item.

CANADA

Develop Vehicle For US Army

The Canadian Government will develop a small, lightweight, tracked vehicle for the United States Army. The $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton high mobility carrier (HMC) will be developed as a replacement for the M29 cargo carrier (*Weasel*) and the M14A1 one-ton sled, under terms of the United States Army-Canadian Development Sharing Program. The HMC, with a trailer of equal payload, is expected to provide outstanding mobility under extreme climatic conditions over difficult terrain and inland waterways.

Gasoline powered, with a 200-mile range, the unarmored vehicle will be designed to be air transportable. When separated from its trailer, it will be light enough to be carried by helicopter. In the northern latitudes, it will be used to tow ski troops, as an ammunition carrier, for casualty evacuation, and for wirelaying, reconnaissance, and other requirements now normally met by the *Mechanical Mule* and the $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck.—News release.

SOUTH AFRICA

Uranium For US And Britain

The Union of South Africa will supply uranium to the United States and Great Britain under terms of a 10-year agreement recently concluded between the South African Atomic Energy Board and the Combined Development Agency of the American and British Atomic Energy Commissions.

The new contract, which supersedes one originally scheduled to run until 1966, provides for the delivery of 3,733 tons of uranium oxide per year for the next six years and 5,953 tons annually during the period 1967 through 1970.—News item.

ITALY

Three-Wheeled "Mule"

Italian Alpine troops are being equipped with a three-wheeled cargo carrier for use over variable terrain. The "3 x 3 mountain vehicle" or "mechanical mule" is designed for the transport of weapons, ammunition, and special materials necessary for mountain troops.

It is adapted to travel on trails of limited width, on steep slopes, and on sharp curves requiring a short turning radius. Two sprocket wheels with tracks are attached to the rear wheel. Powered by a two-cylinder, 20-horsepower engine, its service load is 450 kilograms at 50 kilometers per hour. Without tracks it will climb a 50 percent grade; with tracks, a 70 percent grade.—News item.

SPAIN

Modernization Of Forces

The Spanish armed forces are currently being reorganized and modernized. These forces at present have a strength of 420,000 men. The army with 350,000 soldiers comprises 17 divisions—13 infantry, two mountain, one tank, and one cavalry. Three infantry divisions and two mountain divisions have already been converted into "pentomic units" in the course of reorganization. The navy of 35,000 men has one heavy and four light cruisers, 18 destroyers, 10 submarines, and 92 other craft. The air force, also of 35,000 men (including paratroopers and certain antiaircraft units), has roughly 700 aircraft, chiefly outmoded German models. Spain has received approximately 500 million dollars in United States foreign aid which is being used to support the modernization program.—News item.



MILITARY

BOOKS

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE IN MODERN WARFARE. By Lieutenant Colonel Irving Heymont, United States Army. 244 Pages. Military Service Division, The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1960. \$6.00.

By RUDOLPH L. HOELTZEL

With combat intelligence such a vital component of modern warfare, it is of great value to have a book on the subject of this quality and depth. And with the expected conditions of war evolving so rapidly, it is most timely to have an exposition of combat intelligence updated in terms of nuclear capabilities, increased mechanization and mobility, new communications, and the pentomic organization of our own forces.

This is a book for the intelligence specialist and the person outside the strict intelligence area who wishes to broaden his understanding of current combat operations. To the specialist the book will give a new perspective. To the nonspecialist the book will give a thorough introduction to intelligence functions and techniques.

The book skillfully positions the intelligence function in the total combat effort, stressing the interrelatedness of intelligence and other combat operations. This is helpful in explaining the timing and extent of intelligence collection and dissemination.

The volume also gives a useful sense of the position of combat intelligence in the total intelligence effort. This is done by a description of the entire United States intelligence organiza-

tion, civilian as well as military, by reference to similarities between combat and other spheres of intelligence work, and by discussion of the type of information which may originate in the immediate area of operations, but which is meaningful only to intelligence agencies at higher echelons.

Flexibility in use of this book is provided by its organization. The first half discusses intelligence mainly in terms of principle, including matters of form and specific practices only when necessary for an understanding of the principles at hand. The second half of the book consists of appendices keyed to references in the preceding text. These appendices contain specifics which enlarge on or explain the techniques behind the principles of operation in the foregoing material.

The appendices are by no means an afterthought—they lend solid support to the text, and have been most carefully and thoughtfully prepared in their own right. Given this organization, the general reader may either content himself with the scope of the text part of the book, or go on to the specifics contained in the appendices.

Colonel Heymont, a former instructor at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, has produced a comprehensive picture of combat intelligence which will serve as a useful guide at all levels. This is a book of interest to all those wishing to keep informed on the complexities of modern combat operations.

SPAIN AND DEFENSE OF THE WEST. Ally and Liability. By Arthur P. Whitaker. 408 Pages. Harper & Bros., New York, 1961. \$6.00.

BY LT COL BENJAMIN G. MOORE,
CMLC

With her historical ties to Western Europe, her anti-Communist orientation, and her geographically strategic position as regards both Europe and the Mediterranean, why should not Spain figure more prominently in the growing sense of "community" which is evident everywhere in Western Europe today? Why, for instance, should not Spain be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? As the movement to unite Europe gains momentum, these seemingly simple questions are being heard more and more frequently. Behind them, however, lies a maze of complexities which this timely study helps to illuminate.

After almost two decades of strained relations with her Western European neighbors and the United States prior to 1950, the last 10 years have seen Spain in a slowly evolving *rapprochement* with the West. This study, by a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, is the story of Spain's alienation, of the slow road back, and of the problems and prospects for the future. More specifically, it is the story of the role played by the United States, and of the necessities of Western defense in efforts to establish a new *modus vivendi* with Spain.

As a high point along the road back, the author analyzes the implications of the 1953 Pact of Madrid which provided for the construction in Spain of air and naval bases in return for United States military and economic assistance. Unlike some authorities who have argued recently that these and other bases are already of little

value in the "missile age," the author believes that "the value of the Spanish bases to the United States will remain substantial for a good many years to come." This being the case, it is largely with regard to the political problems that the author sounds a note of caution.

Professor Whitaker, having had some four decades of experience with his subject, does not hesitate to draw his personal conclusions as to the wisdom of past policies with regard to Spain, or to recommend future policies which the United States should follow in seeking to normalize relations with Spain and to draw her into closer relations with the West. Whether the reader agrees with these, the author and the Council on Foreign Relations, which sponsored the study, have rendered a valuable service in highlighting the issues which confront the policymaker and in delimiting the context within which future decisions are likely to be made.

This is a book not only for those interested in the defense of Western Europe, but also for all who are concerned with Western Europe's future political stability, economic prosperity, and unity—and with the stake of the United States therein.

X-15 DIARY. The Story of America's First Space Ship. By Richard Tregaskis. 317 Pages. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1961. \$4.95.

The author of *Guadalcanal Diary* here recounts the day-by-day story of the hundreds of men and women at work on the X-15 project. The author's intention of presenting vivid "verbal photographs" of the test pilots and other persons is accomplished, and is supplemented by a number of excellent photographic illustrations.

SOUTH TO THE NAKTON, NORTH TO THE YALU. June-November 1950. United States Army in the Korean War. By Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Appleman, United States Army Reserve. 813 Pages. Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1960. \$10.00.

Combat historian Roy E. Appleman, veteran of the Korean War, takes the reader of this volume through the first five months of that conflict. This work is the first of five volumes, initiating a series which will present "a comprehensive account of the activities of the U. S. Army in the Korean War." The early twists and turns of that unpredictable "limited war" are fully retraced in this account.

Appleman's reconstruction of the events which shook the world between June and November of 1950 comes as a chilling reminder that disaster can threaten the mightiest of nations if it lets its guard down. Fighting for the first time in history under the flag of the United Nations, American troops and their Free World allies barely managed to stave off defeat in the nightmarish opening months of the conflict. The closing chapters reveal the beginnings of the Chinese Communist intervention that was to dash all hopes of a quick end to the war.

Enjoined, as the author's preface puts it, "to seek the truth of the Korean War and to tell it, no matter whom it might touch unfavorably," Appleman interviewed and corresponded with hundreds of soldiers—"from the private in the ranks to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur"—in his efforts to fill in the gaps in the official record that occurred in the surge of war. The present volume is the result of nine years of dedication to the task of capturing and preserving the truth of what happened.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES. Edited by Joseph S. Roucek. 470 Pages. Philosophical Library, Inc., New York, 1961. \$10.00.

BY COL J. G. HOLLAND, JR., *Inf*

Because Professor Roucek believes both that "... the history of mankind is also the history of wars of ideologies. . . ." and that "... the problem of ideologies as the supreme influence on purposive thinking in social life has been, until recently, ignored . . . in America. . . ." he has gathered in this symposium the essays of 21 American experts on the principal ideological forces in the modern world.

There results a very interesting but rather disjointed collection of papers dealing with Marxism in its various forms, socialism, colonialism, and Zionism. These are followed by current studies of political areas and modern nation states.

The final essay, which is a most interesting account of the political forces within the New Deal, bears the incongruous title, "The American Welfare State. Neither Ideology Nor Utopia." While the essays on France, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Japan are concerned with the post-World War II world, not many people would agree that the New Deal is contemporary. Neither does it appear that Professor Heinz Eulau, the author of the chapter on the New Deal, was consulted about the choice of title for the book for he tells us that "A mature politics cannot afford to be either ideological or utopian. Ideologists and utopians are essentially apolitical."

Military readers will find the book valuable as general background reading. The selected bibliography that follows each essay will be most useful to those engaged in research on any of the topical or political area studies.

OUTWARD BOUND FOR SPACE. By David O. Woodbury. With illustrations by Henry Bugbee Kane. 178 Pages. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1960, 1961. \$4.50.

By COL ERVAN F. KUSHNER, *USAR*

The vastness of space has intrigued and, at times, mystified mankind since the dawn of civilization.

It remained for an American to make the first attempt at a serious solution of the unknown. Dr. Robert H. Goddard pioneered in the early years of the 20th century, conducting actual experiments in controlled high-altitude rockets. His report "A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes" set the mathematical and theoretical pattern to which reaction engines and space flight were to adhere permanently.

Outward Bound for Space is intended by its author both as a primer and history of the new science of space rocketry. Mr. Woodbury has succeeded admirably in both purposes. In clear, simple language, he outlines the technical problems facing man in the attempt to conquer space and the manner and method by which scientists are solving these enigmas in theory and in practice.

The recent advances in space flight can really be understood, in their proper perspective, with the aid of this highly informative story, which gives an almost incredible preview of what lies ahead. In it, the science fiction of yesterday becomes the established fact of today. The most technical aspects and formidable difficulties become easily understandable in the careful manner by which the author presents the space picture.

All of the galaxy of space projectiles, which have now become household words, are reviewed skillfully,

their limitations explained, and their future forecast. The possibilities in the successful race for space are limitless but the need for coordination, among all space and research agencies, is imperative if we are to win this race.

This book provides a means of keeping abreast of the fastest moving enterprise yet undertaken by mankind.

DEFENCE BY COMMITTEE. The British Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959. By Franklyn Arthur Johnson. 416 Pages. Oxford University Press, New York, 1960. \$8.00.

In this thoroughgoing study the author, President of Jacksonville University in Florida, presents a detailed analysis of the history and operation of the British Committee of Imperial Defence. Much of the work is based on interviews with British and American leaders who were connected with the development and functions of the committee system.

The author points out that top-level American advisory bodies, to include the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been organized "largely in imitation of the British model."

The development of our own defense structure has gained much as a result of British efforts with prototype organizations.

It is Mr. Johnson's conclusion that, "the Committee for Imperial Defence was history's most successful experiment, under democratic auspices, in harnessing land, sea, and airpower to the political objectives of strategic planning, preparedness, policy formulation, and war-making." The fact that wide use has been made of similar establishments in democratic nations throughout the world strongly supports his thesis.

THE ASTRONAUTS. The Story of Project Mercury, America's Man-in-Space Program. By Martin Caidin. 192 Pages. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1960. \$3.95.

Despite an obvious factor of built-in obsolescence, which has inevitably appeared in this volume since the first manned space flight has been accomplished, Mr. Caidin's account of preparations for Project Mercury remains one of the liveliest and most readable. Almost a hundred photographs and drawings make the book particularly useful and interesting for the general reader.

BEYOND THE RANGES. By Colonel Consuelo Andrew Seoane, United States Army, Retired, as told to Robert L. Niemann. 256 Pages. Robert Speller & Sons, Inc., New York, 1960. \$5.00.

These personal memoirs range from the Spanish-American to the Korean War, and, aside from their considerable historical value, also make up a celebration of the "Old Army" and its traditions. From his 42 years of Army service, the author emerges as an acute and independent observer of men and events, eloquent in his praise and caustic in criticism of many well-known figures.

CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING. By Robert Ash Wallace. 188 Pages. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Mich., 1960. \$5.95.

By MAJ ROBERT C. BURGESS, *Arty*

Dr. Wallace's well-written book will be useful to military readers interested in the congressional role in budgetary matters. Through case studies of actual appropriations, Dr. Wallace points out the failings of present means of congressional budgetary controls. It is his contention that the methods available to Congress today do not

permit exercise of the legislative power with any great degree of knowledge of the consequences of such control.

The author proposes implementation of Section 206, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which provides for budgetary analyses to be furnished the Congress by the General Accounting Office, a congressional agency. Necessary funds to place this measure in effect have never been appropriated.

COMBAT CAMERAMAN. By Jerry J. Joswick and Lawrence A. Keating. With a foreword by Lieutenant Colonel John D. Craig, United States Air Force, Retired. 200 Pages. Chilton Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1961. \$3.95.

Coauthor Joswick is identified as "the only combat cameraman who returned from the Ploesti Raid," and as the United States' "most decorated combat cameraman" of World War II. This first-person narrative is a miscellaneous and often sentimental account of adventures with gun and camera in the European theater. As Sergeant Joswick, the coauthor served as cameraman with both land and air forces.

CONFEDERATE STRATEGY. From Shiloh to Vicksburg. By Archer Jones. 258 Pages. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, La., 1961. \$5.00.

As the title implies, this is a study of the broad strategy of the Confederate forces during the Civil War years of 1862-63. Divorced from the well-documented considerations of battlefield tactics, it presents a clear picture of Jefferson Davis' over-all direction of the forces of the Confederacy with particular attention to the formation and operation of the Department of the West under General Joseph E. Johnston.

WAR COLLEGE DESIGNATES ASSOCIATE EDITOR



US Army

Root Hall, headquarters of the U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

The United States Army Command and General Staff College is pleased to announce an agreement with the United States Army War College for active participation by the War College in the development of material for publication in the Military Review.

The editorial staff of the Military Review has long recognized its responsibility to the professional reader to present the best in creative military thought regardless of source. The Army's highest educational institution has made notable contributions to this objective. The closer liaison which will result from this cooperative arrangement will promote a more effective dissemination of the military knowledge represented in the Army War College faculty and student body.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel E. Halpin, a member of the Army War College faculty, has been appointed Associate Editor of the Military Review. His office at Carlisle Barracks will provide a contact point for the procurement of articles from Army War College sources.

The U. S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Military Review welcome this support by the U. S. Army War College and look forward to a continually improving professional military journal for the United States Army.—Editor.

